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Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays on social choice and measurement. I study various “ag-
gregation rules” such as voting rules, electoral systems, aggregation formulas of Human
Development Index, and measures of population ageing. These are functions that aggregate
“many” to “one”. For example, voting rules aggregate diﬀerent individual preferences and
choose one alternative from others. Similarly, a measure of population ageing is a function
that maps individual ages to one real number that indicates the level of population ageing in
a society.
In Chapter 1, I propose a voting rule based on cosine similarity. Cosine similarity is a
commonly used similarity measure in computer science. I apply this similarity measure to
define a voting rule, namely, the cosine similarity rule. This rule selects a social ranking that
maximizes cosine similarity between the social ranking and a given preference profile. Our
main finding is that the cosine similarity rule in fact coincides with the Borda rule.
In Chapter 2, I study electoral systems in representative democracies. I define an electoral
system as a function that maps each preference profile to the distribution of seats among
political parties in the congress or legislative chambers. My purpose is to search for electoral
systems in which the distribution of seats in the congress can appropriately reflect preferences
of the people in the nation. I introduce two consistency conditions for electoral systems,
Condorcet consistency and Borda consistency. I first present a paradox of single-member
district systems, namely, the Loser Dominance Paradox, which exhibits diﬃculty in the
consistent aggregation of preferences of the people. Next, I show that single-member district
systems and simple proportional representation systems violate both consistency conditions.
Finally, I propose a new electoral system, namely, the Borda proportional representation
system and show that it satisfies both consistency conditions.
In Chapter 3, I propose a new approach for multidimensional evaluation when achieve-
ments in diﬀerent dimensions are not easily comparable. Our approach can be applied to
measurements of well-being based on capability approach such as human development or
multidimensional poverty. In measurements of such things, we should respect (i) monotonic-
ity to each achievement and (ii) incomparability across diﬀerent dimensions. However, any
method currently in use does not respect (i) or (ii). I introduce a new axiom dimensional
i
independence that captures incomparability across diﬀerent dimensions. Then, I propose
a new methods for multidimensional evaluation and show that our methods satisfy both of
monotonicity and dimensional independence. Moreover, in a certain class of methods, I find
a unique method that satisfies monotonicity, dimensional independence, and minimal lower
boundedness. I apply this method for measurement of human development and compute a
new human development indices of 188 countries.
In Chapter 4 (co-authored with Yuta nakamura and Noriaki Okamoto), we study the
measurement of population ageing. Population ageing is one of the most serious problems
in many developed countries. The level of population ageing is often measured by “usual”
measures such as the share of the older population, mean age, median age, and the dependency
ratio. However, these measures violate elementary properties for measuring population
ageing. We propose a new measure of population ageing that overcomes drawbacks of the
measures currently in use. We introduce a new condition called the working age principle,
which is a sensitivity condition to thickness of the working age population. Our measure is
the only measure that satisfies monotonicity, continuity, separability, normalization, and the
working age principle.
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Chapter 1
Cosine Similarity and the Borda Rule
1.1 Introduction
Cosine similarity is a commonly used similarity measure in computer science. It has a variety
of applications such as document clustering, search engines, and face verification.*1 We apply
this similarity measure to define a voting rule, namely, the cosine similarity rule. The rule
selects a social ranking that is closest to a given preference profile when measured by cosine
similarity. Our main finding is that the cosine similarity rule in fact coincides with the Borda
rule.
The Borda rule is one of the most important voting rules in social choice theory, which
is introduced by Jean-Charles de Borda (1784). It is known that Borda’s choice rule has
many desirable properties such as maximization of the average share of votes in pairwise
comparison (Black 1976, Coughlin 1979), closest proximity to unanimous agreement (Sen
1977; Farkas and Nitzan 1979), avoidance of many paradoxes observed in positional rules
(Saari 1989), and avoidance of the Condorcet loser (Fishburn and Gehrlein 1976, Okamoto
and Sakai 2013). In particular, Young (1974) characterizes Borda’s choice rule by a set of
desirable properties: neutrality, consistency, faithfulness, and cancellation. On the other
hand, there are relatively a few studies on Borda’s ranking rule. In this chapter, we focus on
the Borda rule as a ranking rule. Our result provides a rationale for the use of the Borda rule
based on cosine similarity. The Borda rule selects the ranking closest to a given preference
profile when measured by cosine similarity.
This result is parallel to the better-known characterization of the Condorcet rule. In
his seminal work, Kemeny (1959) searches for desirable ranking rules based on distance
from a given preference profile. He defines a metric that measures the distance between
*1Singhal (2001) briefly explains how to apply cosine similarity to measure the similarity between two text
documents. Cosine similarity is also used as a basis of search engines (see, e.g., Bayardo, Ma, and Srikant 2007).
An application for face verification system is a recent interesting example of applications of cosine similarity
(Nguyen and Bai 2010).
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two rankings, so called Kemeny distance. Then he proposes the ranking rule that selects a
ranking minimizing the sum of Kemeny distances between the social ranking and each voter’s
preference. Surprisingly, it is the unique ranking rule that satisfies neutrality, consistency,
and the Condorcet criterion (Young and Levenglick 1978). Moreover, Young (1988) argues
that what Condorcet (1785) had in mind was in fact the maximum likelihood method, and
he shows that Kemeny’s rule coincides with the maximum likelihood method. Summarizing
these results, Condorcet’s rule selects a ranking that minimizes the sum of Kemeny distances
from voters’ preferences. This characterization of the Condorcet rule is parallel to our
result that Borda’s rule selects a ranking that maximizes the sum of cosine similarities from
voter’s preferences.*2 As Saari (2006) notes, “Condorcet or Borda, which is better?" is the
two-century old question in social choice theory. Now the choice between these two rules
can be attributed to the choice between the Kemeny minimization and the cosine similarity
maximization. If one chooses the former, he is recommended to use Condorcet’s rule, and
if one chooses the latter, he is recommended to use Borda’s rule, as suggested by our main
result.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we introduce definitions. In Section
1.3 we show the equivalence between the Borda rule and the cosine similarity rule. In Section
1.4 we discuss two topics: an implication of restricting the range to the set of linear orderings
and a relationship between the cosine similarity rule and scoring rules. Section 1.5 concludes
this chapter.
1.2 Definitions
Let I = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a finite set of voters and A = fa1; a2; : : : ; amg a finite set of alternatives.
Let R  A A be the set of complete and transitive binary relations on A and P  A A the
set of complete, transitive and anti-symmetric binary relations on A.*3 Each voter i 2 I has a
preference relation %i 2 P on A. A preference profile is a list of preference relations
%  (%i)i2I 2 Pn:
*2Saari and Merlin (2000) conduct a fairly complete analysis of the Kemeny ranking rule. Particularly, they
reveal a deep relationship between the Borda ranking and the Kemeny ranking.
*3A binary relation % is complete if for any a; b 2 A, a % b or b % a. It is transitive if for any a; b; c 2 A,
[a % b and b % c] implies a % c. It is anti-symmetric if for any a; b 2 A, [a % b and b % a] implies a = b.
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A ranking rule is a function F that maps each preference profile % 2 Pn to a social ranking
F (%) 2 R.
For each alternative a 2 A and each preference %i 2 P, let
ra (%i)  jfa0 2 A : a %i a0gj
be the inverse ranking of a 2 A in %i. For example, ra (%i) = 1 means that a is the worst
alternative for i, and ra (%i) = m means that a is most preferred by i. For each %i 2 P, define
r (%i)  (ra1 (%i); ra2 (%i); : : : ; ram (%i)) 2 Nm:
We call r (%i) the rank expression of %i. A preference %i and its rank expression r (%i) have
the same information. The Borda score of a 2 A in % is given by
S(a;%) 
X
i2I
ra (%i):
The following ranking rule is proposed by Borda (1784).
Definition 1 (Borda rule). The Borda rule is the ranking rule FB such that for each % 2 Pn
and each a; b 2 A,
a FB (%) b if and only if S(a;%)  S(b;%):
Next, we define a similarity measure that plays a key role in our analysis.
Definition 2 (Cosine similarity). For each vector x; y 2 Rm++, cosine similarity between x and
y is
C(x; y)  x  ykxkkyk ;
where kxk is the Euclidean norm of x, and x  y denotes the inner product between x and y.
Cosine similarity is a commonly used similarity measure between two vectors. By
definition, C(x; y) = cos x;y, where x;y is the angle between x and y. Therefore, C(x; x) =
cos 0 = 1 and C(x; y)  1 for all x; y 2 Rm++. If the value of C(x; y) is close to 1, we say that
the vectors x and y are similar.
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For example, consider the following four vectors x; y; z and w.
x =
*........,
1
2
3
4
+////////-
; y =
*........,
1
2
3
2
+////////-
; z =
*........,
10
1
1
1
+////////-
; w =
*........,
2
4
6
8
+////////-
:
We have
C(x; y) =
1  1 + 2  2 + 3  3 + 4  2p
12 + 22 + 32 + 42
p
12 + 22 + 32 + 22
; :9467;
C(x; z) =
1  10 + 2  1 + 3  1 + 4  1p
12 + 22 + 32 + 42
p
102 + 12 + 12 + 12
; :3418;
C(x;w) =
1  2 + 2  4 + 3  6 + 4  8p
12 + 22 + 32 + 42
p
22 + 42 + 62 + 82
= 1:
Note that cosine similarity measures the similarity of orientations of two vectors and is
independent from their lengths. Using cosine similarity and rank expressions of preferences,
we can calculate the similarity between two preferences.
Definition 3 (Cosine similarity between two preferences). For each %i and % j 2 P, the cosine
similarity between %i and % j is C(r (%i); r (% j )).
A social rankingmay be aweak ordering that cannot be associatedwith any rank expression
r , so we introduce the following notation. For each vector x 2 Rm++, we call R(x) 2 R the
ranking expressed by x if for each k; ` 2 f1; 2; : : : ;mg,
ak R(x) a` () xk  x` :
Wewill define a new voting rule that selects the social ranking closest to a given preference
profile when measured by this similarity measure.
Definition 4 (Cosine similarity rule). The cosine similarity rule is the ranking rule FC such
4
that for each % 2 Pn,
FC (%) = R(x); where x maximizes
X
i2I
C(  ; r (%i)):*4
This rule selects a social ranking that maximizes the sum of cosine similarities between
the social ranking and each voter’s ranking*5.
1.3 Equivalence theorem
We are now in a position to state our main result. We show that the cosine similarity rule
coincides with the Borda rule.
Theorem 1. For each % 2 Pn,
FC (%) = FB (%):
In other words, for each preference profile, the Borda rule selects the social ranking
closest to the preference profile when measured by cosine similarity. As already mentioned,
the Kemeny rule, which selects the social ranking closest to a given preference profile when
measured byKemeny distance, coincideswith theCondorcet rule. Figure 1 illustrates relations
between the Kemeny rule, the Condorcet rule, the cosine similarity rule, and the Borda rule.
WhileCondorcet’s ruleminimizesKemenydistance, Borda’s rulemaximizes cosine similarity.
Proof. Take any % 2 Pn. Assume that x 2 Nm maximizes
X
i2I
C(  ; r (%i)):
Step 1 (Existence of ). We show that there exists  2 R++ such that xk =   S(ak;%) for
*4The cosine similarity rule is a well-defined (single-valued) function. Indeed, a vector x is not uniquely
determined by % but we will show that R(x) is uniquely determined by % in the proof of Theorem 1.
*5In the definition of the cosine similarity rule, we use vector expression x. This point is diﬀerent from that of
Young and Levenglick (1978), but it is not essential for our results. In Section 1.4.1, we define a cosine similarity
rule without using vector expression and consider only linear orderings, as Young and Levenglick (1978) do.
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Figure 1: Borda’s rule and Condorcet’s rule
all k = 1; 2; : : : ;m. By the definition of cosine similarity,
X
i2I
C(x; r (%i)) =
X
i2I
x  r (%i)
kxkkr (%i)k
=
X
i2I
Pm
j=1 x jra j (%i)
kxkkr (%i)k :
Let kr k  kr (%i)k =
p
12 + 22 +    + m2 for all i 2 I. By the commutative property of
addition,
X
i2I
Pm
j=1 x jra j (%i)
kxkkr (%i)k =
1
kr k
X
i2I
Pm
j=1 x jra j (%i)
kxk
=
1
kr k
mX
j=1
x j
P
i2I ra j (%i)
kxk :
6
Since
Pm
i2I ra j (%i) = S(a j;%),
1
kr k
mX
j=1
x j
P
i2I ra j (%i)
kxk =
1
kr k
mX
j=1
x jS(a j;%)
kxk
=
k(S(a j;%))mj=1k
kr k
Pm
j=1 x jS(a j;%)
kxkk(S(a j;%))mj=1k
=
k(S(a j;%))mj=1k
kr k
x  (S(a j;%))mj=1
kxkk(S(a j;%))mj=1k
;
where (S(a j;%))mj=1 is the vector (S(a1;%); : : : ; S(am;%); ) 2 Nm. By the definition of cosine
similarity,
x  (S(a j;%))mj=1
kxkk(S(a j;%))mj=1k
= C(x; S(a j;%))mj=1)  1:
Therefore,
X
i2I
C(x; r (%i)) 
k(S(a j;%))mj=1k
kr k : (1.1)
SinceC((S(a j;%))mj=1; (S(a j;%))
m
j=1) = 1, by scale invariance property of cosine similarity
*6,
there exists some positive real number  such that
X
i2I
C(x; r (%i)) =
k(S(a j;%))mj=1k
kr k () x =   (S(a j;%))
m
j=1: (1.2)
Step 2 (Completing the proof). Let us complete our proof. By (1.2), since  > 0,
xk  x j () S(ak;%)  S(a j;%) 8ak; a j 2 A:
By the definition of R(x),
xk  x j () ak R(x) a j 8ak; a j 2 A:
*6Cosine similarity is scale invariant, that is, for each x; y 2 Rm++ and for each  > 0, C(  x; y) = C(x; y).
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Therefore,
S(ak;%)  S(a j;%) () ak R(x) a j 8ak; a j 2 A: (1.3)
This implies that the ranking R(x) = FC (%) is uniquely determined by %. Moreover, by (1.3)
and the definition of the Borda ranking, FB (%) = R(x). Therefore, FC (%) = FB (%). 
1.4 Discussion
1.4.1 Linear orderings and another equivalence
Since there are cases in which two alternatives obtain the same Borda scores, it is natural to
assume that the range of ranking rules is the set of weak orderings. Indeed, in the previous
section, we establish the equivalence between the weak Borda rankings and the weak cosine
similarity rankings. However, Young and Levenglick (1978) show the equivalence between
the Kemeny rankings and the Condorcet rankings on the restricted range of linear orderings.
By considering only linear orderings, we can relate Young and Levenglick’s (1978) analysis
with our analysis. In this section, we show the equivalence between the linear Borda rule and
the linear cosine similarity rule.
Definition 5 (Linear Borda rule). The linear Borda rule is a correspondence FLB : Pn  P
such that for each %2 Pn,
FLB (%) = fP 2 P : a j P ak =) S(a j;%)  S(ak;%) 8a j; ak 2 Ag: (1.4)
For example, suppose S(a;%) = 11; S(b;%) = 14; S(c;%) = 11, and S(d;%) = 4. Then
the set of linear Borda rankings is
FLB (%) = fP; P0g;
where
b P c P a P d and b P0 a P0 c P0 d:
Definition 6 (Linear cosine similarity rule). The linear cosine similarity rule is a correspon-
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dence FLC : Pn  P such that for each %2 Pn,
FLC (%) = fP 2 P : P maximizes
X
i2I
C(r (P); r (%i))g:
The linear cosine similarity rule can be defined without using vector expressions, so its
definition is simpler than that of the weak ordering cosine similarity rule.
Theorem 2. For each %2 Pn,
FLB (%) = FLC (%):
Before giving the proof, we oﬀer a lemma. The next lemma is known as the rearrangement
inequality. Since it is nontrivial, we write its proof in Appendix 1.*7
Lemma 1. For any x; y 2 Rm with x1  x2      xm, y1  y2      ym and any
permutation  on f1; 2; : : : ;mg,
mX
k=1
xk yk 
mX
k=1
xk y(k) :
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider any % 2 Pn. Let s 2 Nm be such that s j = S(a j;%) for each
a j 2 A. First, we show that FLC (%)  FLB (%). Take any P 2 FLC (%). By an argument
similar to Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1,
X
i2I
C(r (P); r (%i)) =
ksk
kr k
r (P)  s
kr (P)kksk
=
r1(P)s1 + r2(P)s2 +    + rm(P)sm
kr kkr (P)k :
Since P is a linear order, kr (P)k =
q
1
6m(m + 1)(2m + 1), which is independent of the choice
of P. Therefore,
P maximizes
X
i2I
C(r (); r (%i)) () P maximizes r1()s1 + r2()s2 +   + rm()sm: (1.5)
*7Another proof can be seen in Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952).
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Since P 2 FLC (%), P maximizes Pi2I C(r (); r (%i)), and by (1.5), P is a maximizer of
r1()s1 + r2()s2 +    + rm()sm. Therefore, by Lemma 1,
r j (P) > rk (P) =) s j  sk (1.6)
for each j; k = 1; 2; : : : ;m. Since r j (P) > rk (P) if and only if a j P ak , we have
a j P ak =) s j  sk 8a j; ak 2 A:
Therefore, P 2 FLB (%), which in turn implies FLC (%)  FLB (%).
Next, we show that FLB (%)  FLC (%). Take any P 2 FLB (%). By the definition of r ,
a j P ak if and only if r j (P) > rk (P). Moreover, by the definition of the linear Borda rule
(1.4), a j P ak implies s j  sk for each j; k = 1; 2; : : : ;m. These together imply that
r j (P) > rk (P) =) s j  sk (1.7)
for each j; k = 1; 2; : : : ;m. By (1.7) andLemma1, Pmaximizes r1()s1+r2()s2+  +rm()sm.
By (1.5), P is a maximizer of
P
i2I C(r (); r (%i)). Hence, P 2 FLC (%), that is, FLB (%) 
FLC (%). 
1.4.2 Cosine similarity and scoring rules
In Section 2, we employed rank expression r to convert preferences to numerals. The rank
expression of %i 2 P is
r (%i) = (ra1 (%i); ra2 (%i); : : : ; ram (%i)) 2 Nm;
where
rak (%i) = jfa0 2 A : ak %i a0gj:
Consider otherways to convert preferences to numerals. Consider any vector s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sm) 2
Rm++ with s1 < s2 <    < sm. For each %i 2 P and each a j 2 A, we define sa j (%i) 2 R++ be
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such that
sa j (%i) = sk;
where k = ra j (%i). Then we obtain a vector
s(%i) = (sa1 (%i); sa2 (%i); : : : ; sam (%i)) 2 Rm++
that expresses %i. We call s(%i) s-expression of %i. We show that if we employ s-expression,
the cosine similarity rule is equivalent to the scoring rule associated with the score vector s.
The scoring rule with s, denoting F s, is the ranking rule such that
a j F s (%) ak if and only if
X
i2N
sa j (%i) 
X
i2N
sak (%i)
for each % 2 Pn and a j; ak 2 A. The Borda rule is the scoring rule associated with
s = (1; 2; 3; : : : ;m). Therefore, Theorem 1 is a special case of the following result. Since its
proof parallels that of Theorem 1, we state the result as a corollary.
Corollary 1. Let s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sm) 2 Rm++ with s1 < s2 <    < sm. If we use s-expression,
the cosine similarity rule is equivalent to the scoring rule associated with s.
1.5 Conclusion
We have proposed a voting rule that chooses a social rankingmaximizing the cosine similarity,
namely, the cosine similarity rule. We have shown that the cosine similarity rule coincides
with the Borda rule. Cosine similarity appears often in the literature of computer science to
measure similarity, so our analysis provides a rationale for the use of the Borda rule based on
cosine similarity. Moreover, we have discussed an analogous relation between Borda’s rule
and Condorcet’s rule. The choice between these two rules can be attributed to the choice
between the Kemeny minimization and the cosine similarity maximization.
Cosine similarity clearly satisfies some standard properties such as symmetry, scale in-
variance, and neutrality but violates axioms of distance and some independence axioms such
as local independence. One of important future research is to characterize the cosine sim-
ilarity measure. If we can characterize cosine similarity by some axioms and can compare
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the axioms with those of Kemeny distances, the analysis helps us answer the two-century old
question “Condorcet or Borda?"
Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider any x; y 2 Rm with x1  x2      xm and y1  y2     
ym. Take any permutation  on f1; 2; : : : ;mg.
First, we shall show that if (m) , m, then there exists a permutation  on f1; 2; : : : ;mg
such that
mX
k=1
xk y(k) 
mX
k=1
xk y(k) : (1.8)
Assume that (m) , m. Then, there exist i; j < m such that (m) = i and ( j) = m. Since
xm  x j and ym  yi, (xm   x j )(ym   yi)  0. Therefore,
xmym + x j yi  xmyi + x j ym: (1.9)
Let  be the permutation on f1; 2; : : : ;mg such that
(k) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
m if k = m;
i if k = j;
(k) if k < fm; jg:
By (1.9),
mX
k=1
xk y(k) =
X
k,m; j
xk y(k) + xmym + x j yi

X
k,m; j
xk y(k) + xmyi + x j ym

mX
k=1
xk y(k);
that is, we have (1.8).
Next, we show that if (m) = m and (m   1) , m   1, then there exists a permutation 
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such that
mX
k=1
xk y(k) 
mX
k=1
xk y(k) : (1.10)
Assume that (m) = m and (m   1) , m   1. Then, there exist i; j < m   1 such that
(m 1) = i and ( j) = m 1. Since xm 1  x j and ym 1  yi, we have (xm 1  x j )(ym 1 
yi)  0. Therefore,
xm 1ym 1 + x j yi  xm 1yi + x j ym 1: (1.11)
Let  be the permutation on f1; 2; : : : ;mg such that
(k) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
m   1 if k = m   1;
i if k = j;
(k) if k < fm   1; jg:
By (1.11),
mX
k=1
xk y(k) =
X
k,m 1; j
xk y(k) + xm 1ym 1 + x j yi

X
k,m 1; j
xk y(k) + xm 1yi + x j ym 1

mX
k=1
xk y(k);
that is, we have (1.10).
In a general case, take any ` 2 f1; 2; : : : ;mg and assume that (m) = m; (m   1) =
m   1; : : : ; (` + 1) = ` + 1; and (`) , `. Let  be identical to  except that (`) = ` and
( 1(`)) = (`). Then,
mX
k=1
xk y(k) 
mX
k=1
xk y(k)
by the similar argument. Therefore,
Pm
k=1 xk yk 
Pm
k=1 xk y(k). 
13
Chapter 2
Consistent Representation and Electoral
Systems
2.1 Introduction
Electoral systems are widely used to select governmental representatives in democratic coun-
tries. Since representatives usually belong to political parties, one important function of
electoral systems is to determine the distribution of seats among political parties in the
congress. However, it is a controversial proposition that the distribution of seats in the
congress can appropriately reflect preferences of the people in the nation. The following
example illustrates a paradoxical situation wherein the distribution of seats does not appro-
priately reflect preferences of the people. Consider the example of a nation containing 100
voters who have preferences on political parties X;Y , and Z . They elect five representatives
using a single-member district system with five districts d1; d2; : : : ; d5. There are 20 voters in
each district. Consider the following preference profile.
d1 d2 d3
5 9 3 3 7 11 2 8 5 3 4
X Z Z X X Z Y Y Y X Z
Z X Y Y Z X Z X Z Y X
Y Y X Z Y Y X Z X Z Y
d4 d5
11 5 4 5 6 4 5
Y X Z Y Y X Z
X Y Y X Z Z Y
Z Z X Z X Y X
Table 1: Preference profile
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For example, in district d1, five voters prefer X to Z and Z to Y , and in district d2, eleven
voters prefer Z to X and X to Y . Now, the total number of seats to fill in the congress is five.
This scenario illustrates the questions: Which political party should get a large number of
seats in the congress? What division would make the legislative chamber truly representative?
To tackle these questions, we focus on two central notions in social choice theory: Con-
dorcet winners and Borda winners. Most voting rules are designed to choose a Condorcet
winner, a Borda winner or a near alternative, and it is known that such voting rules have
many desirable properties.*8 Thus, we aim here to require that a political party that is a
Condorcet winner or a Borda winner should receive a large number of seats in the congress,
and a political party that is a Condorcet loser or a Borda loser should receive few number of
seats in the congress.*9 In this preference profile (Table 1),
• Party X is the Condorcet winner and the Borda winner in the nation;
• Party Y is the Condorcet loser and the Borda loser in the nation.*10
Therefore, we expect that X receives more seats in the congress than Y . However, if we
employ the plurality rule in each district, Y gets three seats (in d3; d4;, and d5), Z gets two
seats (in d1 and d2), and X gets no seat in the congress. Moreover, even if scoring rules,
particularly the Borda rule, or voting rules satisfying Condorcet’s principle are employed, the
same result occurs. The house of representatives is dominated by the Condorcet loser and
Borda loser even if desirable voting rules are applied. We call this peculiar situation the Loser
Dominance Paradox. Figure 2 illustrates this paradox.
The Loser Dominance Paradox. In this preference profile (Table 1), Y is the Condorcet
and Borda loser in the nation but it is the dominant party (gains the absolute majority number
*8Black’s method always chooses a Condorcet winner or a Borda winner (Black 1958). The Kemeny-Young-
Method and the Copeland method choose a Condorcet winner or one of the nearest alternatives, and these rules
have desirable properties (Kemeny 1959, Young and Levenglick 1978). Young (1974, 1975) characterize the
Borda rule and scoring rules by sets of desirable properties.
*9A Condorcet winner is an alternative that beats any other alternative in pairwise-majority comparison.
Conversely, a Condorcet loser is an alternative beaten by any other alternative in pairwise-majority comparison.
A Borda winner is an alternative that gets the highest Borda score, and a Borda loser is one that gets the least
Borda score. Formal definitions are given in Section 2.2.
*10Let us show these assertions. X is the Condorcet winner and Y is the Condorcet loser because X beats Y
and Z , and Y is beaten by Z in pairwise-majority comparisons. Indeed, 51 (= 17 + 18 + 7 + 5 + 4) voters prefer
X to Y , 51 (= 8 + 7 + 11 + 16 + 9) voters prefer X to Z and 52 (= 17 + 18 + 4 + 4 + 9) voters prefer Z to Y .
X is the Borda winner in the nation and Y is the Borda loser in the nation because the Borda score of X is
202 (= 3 27+2 48+1 25); that ofY is 197 (= 3 37+2 23+1 40), and that of Z is 201 (= 3 36+2 29+1 35).
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of seats) in the congress if some desirable voting rules are used in each district. Moreover, X
is the Condorcet and Borda winner in the nation but it gets no seats if some desirable voting
rules are used in each district. More precisely,
(i) if we use the plurality rule in each district, Y is the dominant party and X gets no seats;
(ii) if we use any voting rule satisfying Condorcet’s principle, Y is the dominant party and
X gets no seats;
(iii) if we use any scoring rule (including the Borda rule) associated with a score vector
(a; b; c) with a > b  c, Y is the dominant party and X gets no seats.
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
Figure 2: The Loser Dominance Paradox
This argument strongly suggests that a single-member district system may not appropri-
ately reflect preferences of the people. We define Condorcet consistency and Borda consis-
tency to analyze electoral systems that can avoid such a paradoxical situation. Condorcet
(Borda) consistency requires that whenever a Condorcet (Borda) winner and a Condorcet
(Borda) loser exist in the nation, the number of seats in the congress gained by the winner
be greater than or equal to that gained by the loser. Our research takes the same approach
as Borda (1784), who pointed out that the plurality rule may choose a Condorcet loser and
searched for alternative voting rules to avoid choosing a Condorcet loser. Our purpose is
to point out a fatal defect in some prevalent electoral systems and to search for alternative
electoral systems to avoid dominance by Condorcet and Borda losers.
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Situations similar to the Loser Dominance Paradox can emerge in real life. A recent
prominent example is the 2016 United States president election. In the election, Donald
Trump obtained the required majority of votes of state electors and defeated Hillary Clinton.
However, the number of nationwide popular votes for Trumpwas less than that cast for Clinton.
In democratic countries, it is commonly observed that voters cast a ballot to choose electors
or representatives at the first stage, and the electors or representatives vote on important issues
at the second stage, however, such two-stage of electoral systems are vulnerable to this Loser
Dominance Paradox.
The Ostrogorski Paradox (Rae and Daudt 1976) and Simpson’s Paradox (Good and Mittal
1987) are two well-known paradoxes that exhibit conflicts between direct aggregation and in-
direct aggregation. Recent theoretical studies discussing consistent representative democracy
have been conducted by Chambers (2008, 2009). He analyzes a certain class of hierarchial
voting procedures that are robust against gerrymandering, but these studies are independent
from our study.
Our first main result is an impossibility theorem on single-member district systems, which
is a generalization of the Loser Dominance Paradox. The theorem states that in a single-
member district system, under weak conditions, if the plurality rule, Condorcet consistent rule,
or Borda rule are employed, the electoral system is neither Condorcet consistent nor Borda
consistent (Theorem 1). Next, we focus on proportional representation systems. We define a
wide class of proportional representation systems including simple proportional representation
systems. We show that a simple proportional representation system is neither Condorcet
consistent nor Borda consistent (Proposition 1). Finally, we propose a new electoral system,
namely, the Borda proportional representation system. We show that a Borda proportional
representation system is both Condorcet consistent and Borda consistent (Theorem 2).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce our model and
definitions. In Section 2.3, we define single-member district systems and show impossibility
results. In Section 2.4, we define proportional representation systems and discuss desirability
of Borda proportional representation systems. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter.
17
2.2 Definitions
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the set of voters with n  3 and P = fp1; p2; : : : ; pmg be the set of
political parties with m  3. Let R be the set of orderings on P.*11 Each voter i 2 N has a
preference relation %i2 R on the set of political parties P. *12 A preference profile is a list of
preferences
% = (%1;%2; : : : ;%n) 2 RN :
For each N0  N , %N 0= (%i)i2N 0 2 RN 0 denotes the preference profile of group N0. Let a
natural number S 2 N be the number of seats to fill. Let X  Zm+ be the set of possible
distributions of seats in the congress, that is,
X =
8>><>>:(S1; S2; : : : ; Sm) 2 Zm+ :
X
pj2P
Sj = S
9>>=>>; :
2.2.1 Electoral systems
An electoral system E : RN ! X maps each preference profile to a distribution of seats in
the congress. We also write an electoral system E = (D; A; F) because it consists of three
components: a set of electoral districts, apportionments, and voting rules. A set of electoral
districts is D = fd1; d2; : : : ; dt g with t  1 where d1; d2; : : : ; dt are partitions of N , that is,
[dk2Ddk = N and for each two districts dk; d` 2 D, dk \ d` = ;. An apportionment is a
function A : D ! Z+ with
X
dk2D
A(dk ) = S and A(dk )  1 for each dk 2 D:
For instance, A(d1) = 3 indicates that the number of apportioned seats or the number of
winners of the district d1 is 3. If E is a single-member district electoral system, A(dk ) = 1
*11A binary relation %i is an ordering if it is complete and transitive. A binary relation %i is complete if for
any a; b 2 P, a %i b or b %i a holds. It is transitive if for any a; b; c 2 P, [a %i b and b %i c] implies a %i c.
*12In reality, each political party puts up one candidate for each district and each voter has corresponding
preferences on the set of candidates.
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for each k = 1; : : : ; t. A voting rule is a function F : [dk2DRdk ! Zm+ with
mX
`=1
F` (%dk ) = A(dk ) for each dk 2 D;
where F` (%dk ) is the `-th component of F (%dk ). For example, F (%d1 ) = (1; 0; 2; 0) means
that the party p1 wins 1 seat, the party p3 wins 2 seats, and the party p2 and p4 win no seat in
the district d1. Let E be the set of electral systems E = (D; A; F).
For each % 2 RN , each E = (D; A; F) 2 E, and each party p` 2 P, let us denote the
number of winning seats of p` by S` (%; E) 2 Z+, that is,
S` (%; E) =
X
dk2D
F` (%dk ):
When the people’s preference profile is %, the distribution of seats in the congress under the
electoral system E is
S(%; E) = (S1(%; E); S2(%; E); : : : ; Sm(%; E)) 2 X :
2.2.2 Consistency conditions
Before defining consistency conditions, we oﬀer some definitions that play important rolls in
our analysis. We introduce Condorcet winners and Borda winners as desirable alternatives
that should prevail. On the other hand, we introduce Condorcet losers and Borda losers as
undesirable alternatives that should not prevail.
A Condorcet winner is a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise-majority
comparisons. That is, a party p` 2 P is a Condorcet winner in % 2 RN if
jfi 2 N : p` %i p j gj  12n for all p j 2 P; and
jfi 2 N : p` %i pk gj > 12n for som pk 2 P:
A party p` 2 P is a Condorcet loser in % 2 RN if
jfi 2 N : p` %i p j gj  12n for all p j 2 P; and
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jfi 2 N : p` %i pk gj < 12n for som pk 2 P:
For each party p` 2 P and each preference %i 2 R, let
r` (%i)  jfp j 2 P : p` % p j gj + jfp j 2 P : p`  p j gj + 12
be the inverse ranking of p` 2 P at %i. For example, r` (%i) = m means that the party p`
is most preferred by voter i, and r` (%i) = 1 means that the party p` is the worst alternative
for voter i. Note that if fp j 2 P : p`  p j g = fp`g, r` (%i) = jfp j 2 P : p` % p j gj. We call
B` (%)  Pi2N rp` (%i) the Borda score of p` 2 P in %. A Borda winner is a candidate that
gets the highest Borda score. That is, a party p` 2 P is a Borda winner in % 2 RN if
B` (%)  B j (%) for all p j 2 P and B` (%) > Bk (%) for some pk 2 P:
A Borda loser is a candidate that gets the least Borda score. That is, a party p` 2 P is a Borda
loser in % 2 RN if
B` (%)  B j (%) for all p j 2 P and B` (%) < Bk (%) for some pk 2 P:
We require that if a party is a Condorcet winner or a Borda winner, and another party is a
Condorcet loser or a Borda loser in the nation, then the number of seats of the winner should
be greater than that of the loser in the congress.
Condorcet consistency. An electoral system E 2 E is Condorcet consistent if for every
% 2 RN , if there exists p` and p j 2 P such that p` is a Condorcet winner in % and p j is a
Condorcet loser in %, then
S` (%; E)  Sj (%; E):
This requirement is an extension of Condorcet’s principle from social choice functions to
electoral systems. In a similar way, we define Borda consistency for electoral systems.
Borda consistentency. An electoral system E 2 E is Borda consistent if for every % 2 RN ,
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if p` 2 P is a Borda winner in % and p j is a Borda loser, then
S` (%; E)  Sj (%; E):
If an electoral system violates these conditions, the Loser Dominance Paradox occurs. We
search for electoral systems satisfying these conditions.
2.3 Single-member district electoral systems
A single-member district system is one of the commonly used electoral systems. We introduce
its formal definition.
Single-member district electoral system. We call E = (D; A; F) 2 E a single-member
district system if for each dk 2 D, A(dk ) = 1. Clearly, jD j = S. Let E s  E be the set of
single-member district systems.
Since the number of winners in each district is one, we can use familiar voting rules such
as the plurality rule as voting rules F. We focus on three central voting rules; Condorcet rules,
the Borda rule, and the plurality rule.
Condorcet rule. In a single-member district system E = (D; A; F) 2 E s, a voting rule F is
Condorcet if for each %dk2 [dk2DRdk , whenever a Condorcet winner in %dk exists,*13
F` (%dk ) = 1 =) p` is a Condorcet winner in %dk :
Borda rule. In a single-member district system E = (D; A; F) 2 E s, a voting rule F is a
Borda rule if for each %dk2 [dk2DRdk ,
F` (%dk ) = 1 =) p` 2 arg max
pj2P
B j (%dk ):
Plurality rule. In a single-member district system E = (D; A; F) 2 E s, a voting rule F is a
*13A political party p` 2 P is a Condorcet winner in %dk if jfi 2 dk : p` %i pj jg > 12 jdk j for all pj 2 P.
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plurality rule if for each %dk2 [dk2DRdk ,
F` (%dk ) = 1 =) p` 2 arg max
pj2P
jfi 2 dk : i prefers p j bestgj:
We first show that any single-member district system with Condorcet voting rules, Borda
rules, or plurality rules is neither Condorcet consistent nor Borda consistent under some weak
conditions. Although we employ desirable voting rules in each district, the Condorcet winner
in the nation may be the weakest party in the congress. Moreover, it can not avoid that the
Condorcet loser in the nation becomes the dominant party in the congress. This suggests
incompatibility between desirable voting rules and a minimum requirement for electoral
systems under single-member district systems.
Theorem 1. Suppose the number of seats in the congress S  9.*14. Let E = (D; A; F) be a
single-member district electoral system.
(i) If jdk j  3 for each dk 2 D, E is not Condorcet consistent for any Condorcet consistent
voting rule, the Borda rule, or the plurality rule F.
(ii) If jdk j  8 for each dk 2 D, E is not Borda consistent for any Condorcet consistent
voting rule, the Borda rule, or the plurality rule F.
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
In the proof of Theorem 1, we have shown that in any single-member district electoral
system, the weakest political party (both the Borda loser and the Condorcet loser) may be the
dominant party in the congress if voting rules are Condorcet, Borda or the plurality rule.
Corollary 1. Suppose S  9 and let E = (D; A; F) 2 E s be a single-member district electoral
system with jdk j  8 for each dk 2 D. If F is Condorcet, Borda, or the plurality rule, there
exists a preference profile % 2 RN such that there exists a political party p` 2 P such that
p` is both the Condorcet loser and the Borda loser in % but it is the dominant party in the
congress.
*14In fact, when S = 5 or 7, (i) holds but when S = 6 or 8, (i) does not hold. Although S  9 is not a necessary
condition and the lower bound of S for (i) is 5, to simplify the statement of this theorem, we wrote S  9.
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2.4 Proportional representation systems
In the previous section, we confronted with impossibility of consistent representation under
single-member district electoral systems. We next consider whether a proportional represen-
tation system satisfies Condorcet or Borda consistency. There are many types of proportional
representation systems such as Jeﬀerson (d’Hondt), Webster, and the quota method because
the seats of the congress are indivisible and there are diﬀerent ways to deal with fractions. *15
Unfortunately, we show that a proportional representation system is neither Condorcet
consistent nor Borda consistent for any reasonable way to round fractions.
Proposition 1. A proportional representation system is neither Condorcet consistent nor
Borda consistent.
Proof. (Proof by example). Let n = 100, P = fx; y; zg, and S = 30. Define % 2 RN as follows
(Table 2):
30 10 30 30
x x y z
y z z y
z y x x
Table 2: PR is neither Condorcet nor Borda consistent.
In a proportional representation system, seats of (x; y; z) are distributed proportionally to
40 : 30 : 30, so the distribution of seats is
(Sx; Sy; Sz) = (12; 9; 9):
So, the political party x gets the most seats in the congress. However, x is the Condorcet
loser and the Borda loser, and y is the Condorcet winner and the Borda winner.*16 There-
fore, a proportional representation system violates both of Condorcet consistency and Borda
consistency. 
*15Balinski and Young (1975, 1978 and 1982) conduct axiomatic analysis on federal apportionment methods
and proportional representation systems.
*16In majority comparisons, x : y = 40 : 60, x : z = 40 : 60, y : z = 60 : 40, so x is the Condorcet loser and y
is the Condorcet winner. Bx = 180; By = 220:Bz = 200, so x is the Borda loser and y is the Borda winner.
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Single-member electoral systems and proportional representation systems are two of the
most prevalent electoral systems, but they are neither Condorcet nor Borda consistent. Under
these electoral systems, the Loser Dominance Paradox may occur. To avoid the paradox,
we introduce a new electoral system that satisfies both consistency conditions, namely, the
Borda proportional representation system. To define it formally, we introduce the definition
of generalized proportional representation systems. First, we define a rounding function []r
that maps each real number to an integer. A function []r is a rounding function if it is
nondecreasing and for each x 2 R+, [x]r 2 Z+ and
x   1  [x]r  x + 1:
For example, the floor function [] is a rounding function and [x]r = [x + 12 ] is also a rounding
function. All of our results hold for any rounding function. Next, we define a score function
g : RN ! Rm+ that maps each preference profile to an m-dimensional integer vector whose
component g` (%) means the score of p`. In a generalized proportional representation system,
seats are distributed proportionally to scores of parties.
Generalized proportional representation system. We call E = (D; A; F) 2 E a generalized
proportional representation system if D = fN g, A(N ) = S, and F is proportional. A voting
rule F : RN ! Zm+ is proportional if there exists a rounding function []r and a score function
g such that for each % 2 RN , there exists  2 R++ such that for each ` = 1; 2; : : : ;m,
F` (%) =
"
g` (%)

#
r
;
and X
p`2P
F` (%) = S:*17
Let Ep  E be the set of generalized proportional representation systems.
A proportional representation system is one of the generalized proportional representation
*17There may be tie-cases. Tie-breaking should be done monotonically to g` . For example, consider the case
that S = 1, g1 = g2 = 10, and g3 = 1. Then any  > 0 and []r cannot satisfy F1 + F2 + F3 = S, so we need a
tie-breaking. In this case, monotonic tie-breaking rule results in either one of F1 or F2 equals to one and F3 = 0
because g1 = g2 > g3. Our all results hold as long as a tie-breaking rule is monotonically to g` .
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systems, which is based on the simple score function. The simple score function gs is a score
function such that
gs` (%) = jfi 2 N : i prefers p` best at %igj
for each p` 2 P. We can consider various proportional representation systems choosing score
functions. A principal example of them is a Borda proportional representation system, which
is based on the Borda score function gB. It is a score function such that gB
`
(%) = B` (%), the
Borda score of p`, for each party p` 2 P. We call a generalized proportional representation
system with gB a Borda proportional representation system. Under the system, seats are
distributed proportionally to Borda scores that parties gain. Consider the same preference
profile considered in the proof of Proposition 1. Now y is the Borda and Condorcet winner,
and x is the Borda and Condorcet loser. In a Borda proportional representation system, seats
are distributed proportionally to Bx : By : Bz = 180 : 220 : 200, so the distribution of seats is
(Sx; Sy; Sz) = (9; 11; 10):
So, the number of seats of winners is larger than that of losers. This holds in general.
Theorem 2. A Borda proportional representation system is Condorcet consistent and Borda
consistent.
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
A Borda proportional representation system is desirable because it satisfies both con-
sistency conditions, but it has a shortcoming. It may be vulnerable to existence of minor
candidates or candidates unworthy for serious consideration. That is, under a Borda pro-
portional representation system, a very minor political party can often get not a few number
of seats in the congress. For instance, let S = 40 and consider the following profile. In
30 10 30 30
y z y z
z y z y
x x x x
this profile, party x is the worst alternative for all voters. So, it may be a “bad” candidate
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or unworthy for serious consideration. However, under a Borda proprtional representation
system, since Bx : By : Bz = gx : gy : gz = 100 : 260 : 240, we have Sx = 7; Sy = 17 and
Sz = 16. Even if all voters did not want to give party x any seat in the congress, x can get 7
seats, which occupies not a little portion of the total. In addition, since no party is dominant
in the congress, x may be a pivotal.
We can solve this problem by transforming score functions monotonically. For example,
let h(s) = s3 and g` (%) = h(B` (%)) for each p`. Then since gx : gy : gz = 1003 : 2603 : 2403,
we have Sx = 1; Sy = 22 and Sz = 17. Considering another example, let
hQ (s) =
8>>><>>>:
s if s  Q
0 otherwise
for some quota Q  0. The quota Q can depend on m and n. For example, Q can be the
average Borda score, that is, P
p`2P B`
m
=
1
2
n(m + 1):
In this case, Q = 12  100  4 = 200. Then since gx : gy : gz = 0 : 260 : 240, Sy = [20:8]r; Sz =
[19:2]r , and Sx = 0. In general, let h : R+ ! R+ be a nondecreasing function and ghB be
the score function defined as ghB
`
= h(gB
`
) for each ` = 1; 2; : : : ;m. Then, a proportional
representation system with ghB satisfies Condorcet and Borda consistency, and by choosing a
suitable h, we can avoid the problem of very minor candidates. So, there are many types of
proportional representation systems satisfying Borda consistency and Condorcet consistency.
However, a proportional representation system based on positional rules other than the Borda
rule cannot satisfy consistency conditions. That is because the Borda rule is the unique
positional rule that always ranks the Condorcet winner higher than the Condorcet loser (Saari
1990).
We formalize this argument. A score function g : R ! Rm is a proper score function if
there exists a vector a = (a1; : : : ; am) 2 Rm with a1      am, for any % 2 Rn and any
` 2 P,
g` (%) =
X
i2N
ar` (%i );
where r` (%i) denotes the inverse ranking of p` at %i. In other words, a score function is proper
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if its score is generated by some positional rule. The simple majority rule (plurality rule) and
the Borda rule are positional rules, so the simple score function and the Borda score functions
are proper. An axiomatization of positional rules is established by Young (1975), so we here
do not devote us to consider desirability of proportional representation systems with proper
score functions. A generalized proportional representation system E 2 Ep is based on a score
function  if there exists a non-decreasing function h : R+ ! R+ such that for any % 2 Rn
and any ` 2 P,
g` (%) = h(` (%)):
Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let E 2 Ep be a proportional representation system based on a proper score
function. E is Borda and Condorcet consistent if and only if it is based on the Borda score
function.
2.5 Conclusion
Wehave provided the Loser Dominance Paradox in single-member district systems. It displays
that for any Condorcet consistent voting rule or scoring rules, the Condorcet and Borda winner
party may not get any seat in the congress and the Condorcet and Borda loser party gets an
over-half number of seats in the congress. We define the Condorcet consistency and the Borda
consistency to analyze electoral systems that can avoid this paradox. First, we have shown the
incompatibility of these consistency conditions and desirable voting rules in single-member
district systems. Moreover, we have shown that simple proportional representation systems
violates these consistency conditions. Finally, we have proposed the Borda proportional
representation system and showed that it satisfies both consistency conditions.
In our analysis, we have focused on score functions defined by positional rules. Note
that there exists a generalized proportional representation system that is Condorcet and Borda
consistent and not based on proper score functions. A prominent example is a Kemeny
proportional representation system. Let K` (%) be the Kemeny ranking of p` and gK` (%) =
m   K` (%). Then a generalized proportional representation system with gK , namely the
Kemeny proportional representation system, satisfies Condorcet and Borda consistency.*18
*18Of course, we can transform the score function gK into any other one as long as the order of scores is
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That is because the Kemeny rule ranks a Condorcet winner at the top rank if it exists (Young
and Levenglick 1978). Moreover, in Kemeny rankings, Borda winners are always ranked
higher than Borda losers (Saari and Merlin 2000). In summary, proportional representation
systems based on the Borda score function gB or the Kemeny score function gK satisfy both
consistency conditions. Characterizing a class of electoral systems by Condorcet and Borda
consistency and other desirable properties is an important future research.
Appendix 2
Proof of the Loser Dominance Paradox
Proof. (i) and (ii) can be shown easily. We only show (iii). Let F be any scoring rule
associated with the score vector (a; b; c) with a > b  c. Let s(p; d) be the score of party
p 2 fX;Y; Z g in district d 2 fd1; d2; d3; d4; d5g. Then in d1 and d2, Z is the scoring rule
winner. Indeed, for example, scores in d1 are
s(X; d1) = 8a + 9b + 3c;
s(Y; d1) = 0a + 3b + 14c;
s(Z; d1) = 12a + 5b + 3c:
Then, s(Z; d1)   s(X; d1) = 4a   4b > 0 and s(Z; d1)   s(Y; d1) = 12a + 2b   14c > 0.
On the other hand, in d3; d4 and d5, Y is the scoring winner. In fact, for example, scores
in d3 are
s(X; d3) = 3a + 12b + 5c;
s(Y; d3) = 13a + 3b + 4c;
s(Z; d3) = 4a + 5b + 11c:
Then s(Y; d3)   s(X; d3) = 10a   9b   c > 0, s(Y; d3)   s(Z; d3) = 9a   2b   7c > 0.
preserved. That is, letting h be a non-decreasing function and g` = h(m   K` ), a proportional representation
function with g also satisfies both consistency conditions.
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Therefore, Z gets two seats, Y gets three seats, and X can not win in any district if any
scoring rule is used. 
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose that S  9 and E = (D; A; F) is a single-member district system. Without
loss of generality we can assume
jd1 j  jd2 j      jdS j:
Let k  [12S] + 1, where [] is the floor function*19.
Case 1. We first show (i) when F is Condorcet consistent or the plurality rule. Assume that
jdk j  3 for each k = 1; : : : ; S. Let F be a Condorcet consistent rule or the plurality rule. We
first show that there exists % 2 RN such that there exists the Condorcet loser p` in P but p` is
the dominant party, that is,
S` (%; E) 
"
S
2
#
+ 1:
We shall construct a preference profile %2 RN as follows:
%d j ( j = 1; 2; : : : ; k) %d j ( j = k + 1; k + 2; : : : ; S) jd j j
2

+ 1 jd j j  
 jd j j
2

  1 jd j j
p1 p2 p2
p2
:::
:::
::: p1 p1
Table 3: % for (i) when F is Condorcet consistent or the plurality rule.
For each district j = 1; 2 : : : ; k, since
 jd j j
2

+ 1 > jd j j2 , the Condorcet consistent rule or
the plurality rule F chooses p1, i.e., F (%d j ) = (1; 0; 0; : : : ; 0). For each j = k + 1; k + 2 : : : ; S,
the Condorcet consistent rule or the plurality rule F chooses p2, i.e., F (%d j ) = (0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0).
Since p1 wins
f
S
2
g
+ 1 seats, p1 is the dominant party. However, p1 is the Condorcet loser in
*19[x] is the largest integer not greater than x.
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%. To verify this, for each p; q 2 P, define
(p; q)  jfi 2 N : p i qgj:
It suﬃces to show that for all q 2 P,
(p1; q)   (q; p1) < 0:
Take any q 2 P. Then
(p1; q)   (q; p1) =
kX
j=1
 " jd j j
2
#
+ 1
!
  *.,
kX
j=1
 
jd j j  
" jd j j
2
#
  1
!
+
SX
j=k+1
jd j j+/-
=
kX
j=1
 
2
" jd j j
2
#
  jd j j + 2
!
 
SX
j=k+1
jd j j

kX
j=1
2  
SX
j=k+1
jd j j: (2.12)
The last weak inequality holds because 2
f
x
2
g
  x is either  1 or 0 for all integer x. Since
jd j j  3 for all d j 2 D,
kX
j=1
2  
SX
j=k+1
jd j j 
kX
j=1
2  
SX
j=k+1
3: (2.13)
Note that equality of (2.12) holds if and only if jd j j is even number for each j = 1; 2; : : : ; k.
Moreover, note that equality of (2.13) holds if and only if jd j j = 3 for all j = k + 1; : : : ; S.
Thus, if equality of (2.13) holds, since 3  jd1 j  jd2 j      jdS j, jd j j = 3 for all
j = 1; 2; : : : ; S, i.e., these are odd numbers. Therefore, strict inequality must hold in (2.12) or
(2.13). Hence,
(p1; q)   (q; p1) <
kX
j=1
2  
SX
j=k+1
3
= 2
 "
S
2
#
+ 1
!
  3
 
S  
"
S
2
#
  1
!
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= 5
 "
S
2
#
+ 1
!
  3S
 0 (2.14)
The weak inequality in (2.14) holds because S  9.*20 Therefore, p1 is the Condorcet loser
and the dominant party. It is easy to see that p2 is the Condorcet winner but its number of
winning seats is less than that of p1. Thus, any single-member district system with Condorcet
consistent voting rule or the plurality rule is not Condorcet consistent.
Case 2. Next, we show (i) when F is the Borda rule. Assume that jd j j  3 for each
j = 1; : : : ; S. Let F be the Borda rule. We show that there exists a preference profile such that
there exists a party p1 is the Condorcet loser but it is the dominant party in the congress. We
shall construct a preference profile % 2 RN as follows (Table 4).
%d j ( j = 1; 2; : : : ; k) %d j ( j = k + 1; k + 2; : : : ; S)
jd j j  
 jd j j
2

  1 jd j j  
 jd j j
2

  1 2
 jd j j
2

  jd j j + 2
 jd j j
2
  jd j j
2

jd j j   2
 jd j j
2

p1 pm p1 pm p2 p2
p2 pm 1 p2 pm 1 p3 p3
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
pm 1 p2 pm 1 p2 pm pm
pm p1 pm p1 p1 p1
Table 4: A preference profile
In districts d1; d2; : : : ; dk , the Borda rule chooses candidates of the party p1, so S1(%) =f
S
2
g
+ 1, that is, p1 is the dominant party. In districts dk + 1; : : : ; dS, if jd j j is an even number,
p2; : : : ; pm get the same Borda scores, so the Borda rule arbitrarily chooses one of them,
except for p1. We can easily show that p2 is the Condorcet winner but its number of winning
seats is strictly less than that of p1. Since jd j j  3, by the same argument in Case 1, p1 is the
Condorcet loser. Therefore, any single-member district electoral system with Borda rules is
not Condorcet consistent.
Case 3. Next, we show (ii) when F is Condorcet consistent, the plurality rule or the Borda
rule. Assume that jd j j  8 for each j = 1; : : : ; S. Let F be a Condorcet consistent rule or the
*20In fact, when S = 5 and 7, the equality holds. But when S = 6 and 8, it does not hold.
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plurality rule or the Borda rule. We show that there exists a preference profile such that there
exists a party p1 is the Borda loser but it is the dominant party in the congress. We use again
the preference profile % 2 RN of Table 4.
In districts d1; d2; : : : ; dk , candidates of the party p1 win, so p1 is the dominant party. We
can see that the party pm gets the least Borda score except for p1. Therefore, to verify that p1
is the Borda loser, it suﬃces to show that
B1(%)   Bm(%) < 0:
By simple calculations, we have the following inequalities.
B1(%)   Bm(%) =
kX
j=1
B1(%d j ) +
SX
j=k+1
B1(%d j )  
kX
j=1
Bm(%d j )  
SX
j=k+1
Bm(%d j )
=
kX
j=1
(B1(%d j )   Bm(%d j )) +
SX
j=k+1
(B1(%d j )   Bm(%d j ))
=
kX
j=1
(m   1)
 
2
" jd j j
2
#
  jd j j + 2
!
+
SX
j=k+1
jd j j
 
SX
j=k+1
 
m
" jd j j
2
#
+ 2
 
jd j j  
" jd j j
2
#!!
=
kX
j=1
(m   1)
 
2
" jd j j
2
#
  jd j j + 2
!
 
SX
j=k+1
m
" jd j j
2
#
+
SX
j=k+1
 
2
" jd j j
2
#
  jd j j
!
|                       {z                       }
 0

kX
j=1
(m   1)
 
2
" jd j j
2
#
  jd j j + 2
!
 
SX
j=k+1
m
" jd j j
2
#
:
Since 2
 jd j j
2

  jd j j + 2 equals to 1 or 2,
kX
j=1
(m   1)
 
2
" jd j j
2
#
  jd j j + 2
!
 
SX
j=k+1
m
" jd j j
2
#

kX
j=1
2(m   1)  
SX
j=k+1
m
" jd j j
2
#
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
kX
j=1
2(m   1)  
SX
j=k+1
m
" jdk+1 j
2
#
;
because jdk+1 j  jdk+2 j      jdS j.
Let a =
f jdk+1 j
2
g
. Then, we have
B1(%)   Bm(%) 
kX
j=1
2(m   1)  
SX
j=k+1
ma
= 2
 "
S
2
#
+ 1
!
(m   1)  
 
S  
"
S
2
#
  1
!
ma
=
 
2
"
S
2
#
+ 2   Sa  
"
S
2
#
a   a
!
m 2
 "
S
2
#
+ 1
!
|           {z           }
< 0
<
 
2
"
S
2
#
+ 2   Sa  
"
S
2
#
a   a
!
m:
If
2
"
S
2
#
+ 2   Sa  
"
S
2
#
a   a  0; (2.15)
we can conclude B1   Bm < 0. When
jdk+1 j  4(S + 3)S   3 ;
the inequality (2.15) holds. Since S  9,
4(S + 3)
S   3 
48
6
= 8:
Thus, by the assumption jd j j  8, (2.15) holds. Therefore, p1 is the Borda loser in % but
is the dominant party. We can easily show that p2 is the Borda winner in %. Hence, any
single-memebr electoral system with a Condorcet consistent rule or the plurality rule or the
Borda rule is not Borda consistent. 
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Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let E 2 Ep be a Borda proportional representation system, that is, jD j = fN g,
A(N ) = S, and F is a Borda proportional voting rule. Consider any % 2 RN . Note that
F` (%) =
"
B` (%)

#
r
;
and X
p`2P
F` (%) = S
where  2 R++ and []r is some rounding function. By the following Lemma 1, the Borda
rule ranks a Condorcet winner higher than a Condorcet loser, if p` is a Condorcet winner and
p j is a Condorcet loser,
B` (%)  B j (%):
Moreover, by the definition of the Borda rule, if p` is a Borda winner and p j is a Borda loser,
B` (%)  B j (%):
Since []r is nondecreasing,
F` (%)  Fj (%):
Therefore, it is Condorcet and Borda consistent. 
Lemma 1. The Borda rule ranks a Condorcet winner higher than a Condorcet loser.
Proof. Consider any % 2 R. Suppose that pw 2 P is a Condorcet winner in % and p` 2 P is a
Condorcet loser in %. We show that Bw (%) > B` (%).
Since pw is a Condorcet winner,
jfi 2 N : pw %i p j gj  12n for all p j 2 P; and
jfi 2 N : pw %i pk gj > 12n for som pk 2 P:
Thus, X
pj2P
jfi 2 N : pw %i p j gj > 12nm:
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Since
P
pj2P jfi 2 N : pw %i p j gj =
P
i2N jfp j 2 P : pw %i p j gj = Bw (%),
Bw (%) >
1
2
nm:
On the other hand, by symmetry, we have B` (%) < 12nm. Therefore, Bw (%) > B` (%). 
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Chapter 3
Multidimensional Evaluation: An
Ordinal Approach
3.1 Introduction
Since Amartya Sen (1985) advocated capability approach, we have had a wide agreement
that a multidimensional approach is necessary for measurement of human well-being. Re-
searchers and policymakers have createdmanymultidimensional measures such as the Human
Development Index (HDI), Human Poverty Index (HPI), and Alkire-Foster Method (Alkire
and Foster 2011a). Usually, achievements in diﬀerent dimensions are not easily comparable
because capabilities and functionings are ordinal in nature. Moreover, achievement in each
dimension has its own value for capabilities (Sen 1990), so those should not be easily substi-
tutable. Therefore, if we respect the idea of capabilities, we should respect incomparability
and non-substitutability across diﬀerent dimensions. However, currently used measures, par-
ticularly HDI and HPI, do not respect these ideas because these measures carelessly aggregate
achievements in diﬀerent dimensions.
The Human Development Index, created by the United Nations Development Programme
in 1990, is a summary measure of three key dimensions of human development; income,
health, and education. The current HDI aggregates achievements in three dimensions by the
geometric mean. That is, it is of the form of
HDI =
 
y1  y2  y3 13 ;
where yi (i = 1; 2; 3) denotes achievement in income, education, and health, respectively. This
aggregation formula has some desirable properties and is characterized by a set of axioms
(Herrero, Martínez, and Villar 2010; Zambrano 2014; Kawada, Nakamura, and Otani 2018).
In this，, we claim that the current aggregation formula of HDI is not sophisticated because
it cannot meet the idea of capabilities in the following sense. Since the aggregation formula
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is the geometric mean, achievements in diﬀerent dimensions are treated easily comparable
and substitutable: 1% increase in income is equally counted to 1% increase in human life.
Needless to say, there is no rigor basis for comparing values in diﬀerent dimensions and this
way of comparisons does not respect the idea of capabilities.*21
Alkire and Foster (2011a) propose an approach for measurement of multidimensional
poverty that can respect incomparability across dimensions, so-called the Alkire-Foster
method. However, the Alkire-Foster method that respects cross-dimensional incompara-
bility (M0) cannot satisfy a traditional monotonicity condition: An index should increase
if achievements in all dimensions increase.*22 The traditional monotonicity condition has
been emphasized in the literature since the seminal work of Sen (1976). Of course, HDI
and many poverty measures except for the Alkire-Foster’s M0 satisfy the monotonicity con-
dition. Summarizing above arguments, any existing multidimensional measure that respect
cross-dimensional incomparability violates the traditional monotonicity.
In this chapter, we propose new methods for multidimensional evaluation that respects the
monotonicity and cross-dimensional incomparability. We propose a new axiom dimensional
independence that captures incomparability across dimensions. Then, we introduce new
evaluation methods and show that our methods satisfy both of monotonicity and dimensional
independence. Moreover, in a certain class of methods, we find a unique method that satisfies
monotonicity, dimensional independence, and minimal lower boundedness. Our method can
be applied to various multidimensional evaluation problems such that measurement of human
development and multidimensional poverty. Using this method, we compute a new human
development indices of 188 countries.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce our model.
In Section 3.3, we introduce our methods and show main results. In Section 3.4, we apply our
method for measurements of human development. In Section 3.5, we concludes this chapter.
*21In addition, the Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) is a summary measure of longevity, knowledge, and decent
standard of livings. More precisely, it aggregates probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult illiteracy
rate, ratio of population without sustainable access to an improved water source and children under weight for
age (United Nations 2015). These diﬀerent dimensions relate very diﬀerent capabilities, but its aggregation
formula do not suﬃciently care about incomparability across dimensions.
*22More precisely, the Alkire-Fsoter Method is a class of measures M parametrized by   0. In the class of
the methods, M0 works with ordinal data well and can respect cross-dimensional incomparability but it violates
the monotonicity. On the other hand, when  > 0, M satisfies the monotonicity but it cannot work with ordinal
data well.
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3.2 Definitions
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the set of nations and D = f1; 2; : : : ; dg be the set of dimensions.
We assume that n  3 and d  3. Let y = [yik] 2 Rnd+ denote the matrix of achievements,
where yik is the achievement of nation i in dimension k. A row vector yi 2 Rd+ indicates
the vector of achievements of nation i. Usually, some dimensions describe cardinal data and
other dimensions do only ordinal data. Let Y = Rnd+ be the set of all possible data.
To make a ranking of nations, we introduce score functions. Let s : N Y ! R be a score
function, where typical element s(i; y) is the score of nation i when data is y. A score should
be interpreted as an ordinal number. Note that a score s(i; y) may depend on data y.
We introduce some axioms for score functions. We call a nation i 2 N dominates j 2 N
at y if
yik  y j k for all k 2 D; and
yik 0 > y j k 0 for some k0 2 D:
The first axiom requires that a score of a nation should be higher than that of another nation
if the former nation dominates the latter.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity). A score function s ismonotonic if for each y 2 Y and each i; j 2 N ,
s(i; y) > s( j; y)
whenever i dominates j at y.
Monotonicity seems to be weak, but some existing measures does not satisfy this. For
example, the head-count ratio and Alkire-Foster methods M0 violate monotonicity in general.
Alkire-Foster methods M satisfy monotonicity when  > 0 but they cannot work well with
ordinal data. We introduce the following axiom that captures the idea “work well with ordinal
data."
Axiom 2 (Dimensional independence). A score function s is dimensionally independent if
for each y 2 Y , each dimension k 2 D, each strict increasing function f : R+ ! R+, and each
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i; j 2 N ,
s(i; y)  s( j; y) () s(i; ( f (yk ); y k ))  s( j; ( f (yk ); y k ));
where f (yk ) is a column vector ( f (y1k ); f (y2k ); : : : ; f (ynk )) 2 RN .
The idea of this axiomhas been often discussed in the literature (Atkinson 2003; Maasoumi
and Lugo 2007; Alkire and Foster 2011a/b), but its formal definition has not been given before.
If a score function is dimensionally independent, then it works with ordinal data well. The
geometric mean, the current aggregation formula of the Human Development Index, violates
dimensional independence. For example, D = f1; 2; 3g and define s(i; y) =  yi1yi2yi3 13 for
each y 2 Y and i 2 N . Let yi = (4; 2; 1) and y j = (8; 1; 1). Then s(i; y) = s( j; y) = 8 13 = 2.
However, let f (x) = x 13 and let y0 = ( f (y1); y 1). Then
s(i; y0) =

4
1
3  2  1
 1
3
> 2
1
3 =

8
1
3  1  1
 1
3
= s( j; y0):
Therefore, the geometric mean violates dimensional independence.
3.3 Methods and Results
We introduce a class of score functions that satisfy monotonicity and dimensional indepen-
dence.
Definition 1 (score function s). Let s be the score function such that for each y 2 Y and
i 2 N ,
s(i; y) = jf j 2 N : i dominates j at ygj:
The score function s of i simply counts the number of nations dominated by i. We can
define a class of similar score functions generalizing the definition of the dominance relation.
For each t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; dg, each y 2 Y , and each i; j 2 N , i t-dominates j at y if
jfk 2 D : yik  y j k gj  t and jfk 2 D : yik > y j k gj  1:
Definition 2 (score function st). For each t 2 D, let st be the score function such that for each
y 2 Y and i 2 N ,
st (i; y) = jf j 2 N : i t-dominates j at ygj: (3.16)
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Note that sd = s. We call these score functions st (t = 1; 2; : : : ; d) simple score functions.
All simple score functions satisfy monotonicity and dimensional independence.
Proposition 1. For each t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; dg, the score function st satisfies monotonicity and
dimensional independence. In particular, s satisfies both of them.
Proof. See Appendix 3. 
In fact, there are many other score functions satisfy both monotonicity and dimensional
independence. In particular, score functions sB and sN are intuitive examples of them.
Definition 3 (Borda score function sB). Let sB be the score function such that for each y 2 Y
and i 2 N ,
sB (i; y) =
X
k2D
jf j 2 N : yik  y j k gj:
In this definition, jf j 2 N : yik  y j k gj is the number of nations that is ranked lower than
i, namely, it is called the Borda score of i in dimension k (Borda 1784). Therefore, we call sB
the Borda score function. Similarly, we can define another score function multiplying Borda
scores instead of summing them.
Definition 4 (Borda-Nash score function sN ). Let sN be the score function such that for each
y 2 Y and i 2 N ,
sN (i; y) =
Y
k2D
jf j 2 N : yik  y j k gj:
In this definition, it does not simply compute the product of (yik )k2D, but does the product
of the Borda scores of yi. That is the reason why we call sN the Borda-Nash score function.
In these definitions, sB and sN use only ordinal information of y. Therefore, they satisfy
dimensional independence.
Proposition 2. The score functions sB and sN satisfy monotonicity and dimensional inde-
pendence.
Proof. See Appendix 3. 
We give a numerical example of ways of computation of these score functions. Consider
that we have the following data y (Table 5). To compute scores easily, we make the matrix
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dimensions
nations 1 2 3
1 28 5 3
2 30 4 0
3 25 7 2
4 25 5 1
5 32 6 3
6 25 3 1
Table 5: Numerical example: data y
dimensions methods
nations 1 2 3 s s1 s2 sB sN
1 4 4 6 2 4 4 14 96
2 5 2 1 0 4 1 8 10
3 3 6 4 2 5 3 13 72
4 3 4 3 1 2 2 10 36
5 6 5 6 4 5 5 17 180
6 3 1 3 0 0 0 7 9
Table 6: Numerical example: values of jf j 2 N : yik  y j k gj and scores
whose component is jf j 2 N : yik  y j k gj for each dimension k 2 D (Table 6).
For example, if we use s, nation 5 is ranked first and nation 2 and nation 6 are ranked
worst.
There are many score functions satisfying monotonicity and dimensional independence.
Then, which score function is the most appropriate for measuring the level of human develop-
ment? Looking at the Table 5 in the above example, the achievement of nation 2 in dimension
3 is 0. However, scores of nation 2 is not the worst one in all score functions except for
s. Thus, sB, sN , and st except for s violate minimal lower boundedness, a key axiom for
measures of human development (Herrero, Martinez and Villar 2010).
Axiom 3 (Minimal Lower Boundedness). A score function s is minimal lower bounded if for
each y 2 Y and each i; j 2 N ,
s(i; y)  s( j; y)
whenever min(yi) = 0 < min(y`) for any ` 2 N n fig.
Proposition 3. The score functions sB and sN violate minimal lower boundedness.
41
Proof. In the above example (Tables 5 and 6), the achievement of nation 2 in dimension 3 is
0, and any other achievement in the matrix is larger than 0. However, sB (2; y) = 8 > 7 =
sB (6; y) and sN (2; y) = 10 > 9 = sN (6; y). Therefore, sB and sN violate minimal lower
boundedness. 
Finally, we state that s is the only method that satisfy minimal lower boundedness in the
class of simple score functions.
Proposition 4. For any t = 1; 2; : : : ; d, if a score function st satisfies minimal lower bound-
edness, then st = s.
Proof. See Appendix 3. 
3.4 New HDI Ranking
Using s, wemake a newHDI ranking (Figure 3).*23 We compute the ranking of 188 countries
but we only display the ranking of the top 18 countries here. The ranking R1 is the current
HDI ranking and R2 is the new ranking based on s. In fact, these rankings are very similar.
For example, the cosine similarity between two rankings (rankings of 188 countries) is 0.9965.
*24
However, there exist some countries such that their rankings in R1 are very diﬀerent
from those in R2. In particular, Kuwait’s and Singapore’s rankings saliently diﬀer in current
and new HDI rankings (Figure 4). The ranking of Kuwait in R1 is 51st but that in R2 is
90th, so R1   R2 is  39. To see the reason why R1 and R2 of Kuwait are so diﬀerent, we
look at the data of Kuwait and similarly-ranked countries (Figure 5). In Figure 5, GNI per
capita of Kuwait is relatively very high among those of similarly-ranked countries. Then,
low achievements in other dimensions of Kuwait are substituted by the high achievement in
the income dimension. Therefore, the ranking of Kuwait is computed as too high in R1.
*23Data are sourced from the United Nations Development Report 2015 (United Nations 2015).
*24Cosine similarity is a commonly used similarity measure in computer science discussed in Chapter 1. The
definition of the cosine similarity between two vectors is as follows: For each vector x; y 2 Rm++, cosine similarity
between x and y is
C(x; y)  x  ykxkkyk ;
where kxk is the Euclidean norm of x, and x  y denotes the inner product between x and y.
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That is, the current aggregation method of HDI (the geometric mean) might treat values
in diﬀerent dimensions substitutable. We claim that this way of computation of HDI does
not meet the idea of capabilities. That is mainly because the current HDI does not satisfy
dimensional independence. On the other hand, in R2, based on our method s, comparability
and substitutability across dimensions are almost excluded because s satisfies dimensional
independence. Therefore, if we respect capability approach, then we should use s for
computing HDI ranking.
HDI Rank (R1) Countrty Our New HDI Rank (R2) R1 - R2
1 Norway 2 -1
2 Australia 1 1
2 Switzerland 8 -6
4 Germany 4 0
5 Denmark 7 -2
5 Singapore 19 -14
7 Netherlands 12 -5
8 Ireland 3 5
9 Iceland 6 3
10 Canada 9 1
10 United States 14 -4
12 Hong Kong 21 -9
13 New Zealand 4 9
14 Sweden 9 5
15 Liechtenstein 27 -12
16 United Kingdom 12 4
17 Japan 16 1
18 Korea (Republic of) 9 9
Figure 3: Current ranking and new ranking of HDI
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R1 (current HDI) R2 (new HDI) R1 - R2
Kuwait 51st 90th -39
Singapore 5th 19th -14
Figure 4: Kuwait’s and Singapore’s rankings saliently diﬀer in R1 and R2.
R1 HDI Life expectancy
Expected years of 
 schooling
Mean years of  
schooling
GNI per  
capita
48 Montenegro 0.807 76.4 15.1 11.3 15410
49 Russian Federation 0.804 70.3 15.0 12.0 23286
50 Romania 0.802 74.8 14.7 10.8 19428
51 Kuwait 0.800 74.5 13.3 7.3 76075
52 Belarus 0.796 71.5 15.7 12.0 15629
52 Oman 0.796 77.0 13.7 8.1 34402
54 Barbados 0.795 75.8 15.3 10.5 14952
Figure 5: Data of Kuwait and similarly-ranked countries
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3.5 Conclusion
We have proposed newmethods for multidimensional evaluation when achievements in diﬀer-
ent dimensions are not easily comparable or sustitutable. Existing methods for multidimen-
sional evaluation do not simultaneously satisfy monotonicity and dimensional independence,
but our proposed methods satisfy both of them. Moreover, in a certain class of methods, we
have found a unique method that satisfiesmonotonicity, dimensional independence, andmini-
mal lower boundedness. Our methods can be applied to various problems of multidimensional
evaluation such as measurements of human development and multidimensional poverty. In
this chapter, we have applied one of our methods to make new HDI ranking of 188 countries
and compare the current and newHDI rankings. According to the idea of capability approach,
which is the basic concept of HDI, diﬀerent achievements in diﬀerent dimensions should not
be easily substitutable. Comparing the current and new HDI rankings, we have claimed that
the current HDI does not respect the property. Finally, we have claimed that if we respect
the idea of capabilities, we should use our measure for making HDI rankings. Applying our
methods to measurement of multidimensional poverty remains in future research.
Appendix 3
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 1. For any y 2 Y , each i; j 2 N , and each t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; dg, if i dominates j at y, then
i t-dominates j at y.
Proof. Take any y 2 Y , i; j 2 N , and t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; dg. Suppose that i dominates j at y. Then
yik  y j k for all k 2 D and yik 0 > y j k 0 for some k0 2 D:
Therefore,
jfk 2 D : yik  y j k gj = d  t and jfk0 2 D : yik 0 > y j k 0gj  1:
Thus, i t-dominates j at y. 
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Lemma 2. The dominance relation is transitive. That is, for any y 2 Y , and each i; j; ` 2 N ,
if i dominates j at y and j dominates ` at y, then i dominates ` at y.
Proof. Consider any y 2 Y , and any i; j; ` 2 N such that i dominates j at y and j dominates
` at y. Then
yik  y j k  y`k
for all k 2 D. Moreover, yik 0 > y j k 0 or y j k 0 > y`k 0 holds for some k0 2 D. Thus, i dominates
` at y. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider any t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; g. Let st be the score function defined by
(3.16).
We first show that st satisfies monotonicity. Consider any y 2 Y and take any i; j 2 N
such that i dominates j at y. By Lemmas 1 and 2, it has been shown that for any ` 2 N such
that ` is t-dominated by i at y, ` is also t-dominated by j at y. Moreover, since j itself is
t-dominated by i at y,
jf` 2 N : i t-dominates ` at ygj  jf` 2 N : j t-dominates ` at ygj + 1:
Therefore,
st (i; y) = jf` 2 N : i t-dominates ` at ygj
> jf` 2 N : j t-dominates ` at ygj
= st ( j; y):
That is, st satisfies monotonicity.
Next, we show that st satisfies dimensional independence. Let f be any strict increasing
function R+ ! R+. Consider any y 2 Y and any k 2 D. Let y0 =   f (yk ); y k  . It suﬃces to
show that st (i; y) = st (i; y0) for any i 2 N . Since f is strict increasing function,
yik  y j k () f (yik )  f (y j k ) () y0ik  y0j k
for all i; j 2 N . Therefore, st (i; y) = st (i; y0) for any i 2 N . 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let sB be the Borda score function. Consider any y 2 Y and any i; j 2 N . Suppose
that i dominates j at y. We show that sB (i; y) > sB ( j; y).
By the definition of the dominance relation, for each k 2 D and each ` 2 N , if y j k  y`k ,
then yik  y`k . Therefore, for each k 2 D,
jf` 2 N : yik  y`k gj  jf` 2 N : y j k  y`k gj:
Moreover, because j is dominated by i, there exists k0 2 D such that
jf` 2 N : yik 0  y`k 0gj  jf` 2 N : y j k 0  y`k 0gj + 1:
Thus, X
k2D
jf` 2 N : yik  y`k gj >
X
k2D
jf` 2 N : y j k  y`k gj;
that is, sB (i; y) > sB ( j; y). It is easy to show that sB is dimensionally independent because
any strict increasing function f does not change values of jf` 2 N : yik  y`k gj for all i; ` 2 N
and k 2 D.
A proof for the Borda-Nash score function sN is similar. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We first show that s satisfies minimal lower boundedness. Consider any y 2 Y .
Suppose that min(yi) = 0 and min(y j ) > 0 for all j 2 N n fig. Then, i cannot dominate any
other nation. Therefore, s(i; y) = 0. This implies that i is ranked worst.
Next, we show that st violates minimal lower boundedness if t , d. Take any t 2
f1; 2; : : : ; d   1g and let st be the simple score function. Let y1 = (0; 1; 1; : : : ; 1) 2 Rd+ and
y j = (1; 0:1; 0:1; : : : ; 0:1) 2 Rd+ for each j = 2; 3; : : : ; n. Then, nation 1 t-dominates j at y for
any j = 2; 3; : : : ; n. Therefore, st (i; y) > 1 because n  3 and d  3. On the other hand, we
first consider the case in which t , 1. Then, nation j cannot t-dominates ` for any ` 2 N .
Therefore, s( j; y) = 0 for each j = 2; 3; : : : ; n. We next consider the case in which t = 1.
Then nation j only can 1-dominates 1. Therefore, s( j; y) = 1 for each j = 2; 3; : : : ; n. Thus,
47
the ranking of nation 1 is not worst one though it has the minimal achievement. Hence, st
violates minimal lower boundedness. 
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Chapter 4
The Measurement of Population Ageing
*25
4.1 Introduction
Population ageing is one of the most serious problems in many developed countries. Accord-
ing to the United Nations Population Division Reports, it is unprecedented, pervasive, and
enduring (United Nations 2002). The level of population ageing is often measured by the
ratio of the older population among the entire population (e.g., people aged over 65 years),
the so-called head-count ratio. For example, in Japan, the head-count ratio is 4.8% in 1950,
26.6% in 2015, and is projected to reach 33.4% by 2035.*26 Although the head-count ratio
is quite often used, it violates at least two elementary properties for measuring population
ageing.
First, the head-count ratio violates a monotonicity property with respect to ages. For
example, even though all older individuals become further older, as long as the number of
them remains the same, the increase in ages of older individuals does not aﬀect the head-
count ratio. This means that even if the head-count ratio is 10%, a distribution with “10% of
individuals mostly in the range 65–74 years old" cannot be distinguished with a distribution
with“10% of individuals mostly in the range 75–84 years old".
Moreover, the index is insensitive to the distribution of ages. Especially, it fails to take
thickness of the working age population into account (e.g., people aged between 20 and
64 years). One non-negligible facet of population ageing is that the supply of the labor
force by the working age population becomes scarce to the demand by the older population
or economically inactive population. Particularly, the government of Japan confronts with
a substantial budget imbalance due to large increases in the public expenditures for social
*25This chapter is co-authored with Yuta Nakamura and Noriaki Okamoto, and based on Kawada, Nakamura,
and Okamoto (2017).
*26The population structure data and projections in Japan are sourced from the National Institute of Population
and Social Security Research 2017.
49
security systems and a decrease in tax-revenue caused by shrinking labor force, e.g., total
expenditures for social secury systems exceed 23% of GDP in 2014 in Japan (Kitao 2015).
However, since the head-count ratio simply counts the number of older people and checks the
percentage among the entire population including the people aged under 19 years, it fails to
reflect thickness of the working age population. Similarly, all measures used in the United
Nations reports such as the median age and the total dependency ratio have at least one of
these two drawbacks.
The choice of measures of population ageing is important. That is because it is diﬃcult to
capture the complicated phenomenon of population ageing without help of some measures,
and they shape our perception of demographic trends. Therefore, if a government uses a
“bad" measure to perceive demographic trends, the government might misperceive the trends
and fail to plan appropriate policies against population ageing.
In this chapter, we propose a new measure of population ageing that overcomes short-
comings of the measures currently in use. We characterize the new measure by monotonicity,
the working age principle, and other standard axioms. The working age principle, which
is introduced in this ， and inspired by the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Dalton 1920),
is a sensitivity condition to thickness of the working age population. We also compute our
measure for population data of China and Japan. This computation illustrates diﬀerences
between our measure and the head-count ratio.
Our measure satisfies both of two elementary properties, monotonicity and the working
age principle, and existing measures violate at least one of these properties. In this sense, our
measure improves existing measures. Of course, it does not mean that our measure supersedes
all of them. Population ageing is a complex phenomenon with various facets, so we cannot
fully measure it using just one measure. Our contribution is to add a new measure to a set of
tools for measuring population ageing.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces our model. Section
4.3 presents our axioms. In Section 4.4, we characterize the new index function of population
ageing by a set of axioms. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. All omitted proofs are relegated
to Appendix.
50
4.2 Model
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a set of individuals in a society and n  3. Each individual i 2 N
has a corresponding age yi 2 [0; y¯]  R. An age profile is a list of individual ages y =
(y1; : : : ; yn) 2 [0; y¯]n. An age yi 2 [0; y¯] is a working age if yi 2 [x; z], where x; z 2 (0; y¯] and
x < z. The age x indicates the requirement age for starting work, and z does the retirement
age. The residual term for working at yi 2 [0; y¯] is
a(yi) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
z   x if yi < x;
z   yi if x  yi  z;
0 if z < yi;
that is, at age yi < x, individual i has the residual term z   x for working since he has not
attained working ages, at age x  yi  z, individual i has the residual term z   yi for working
since he has worked for yi   x years, and at age yi > z, individual i has no residual term
for working since he has already passed the retirement age. An index function is a function
I : [0; y¯]n ! R that maps each age profile y 2 [0; y¯]n to a real number I (y) 2 R. For example,
an index function defined as
IH (y) =
jfi 2 N : yi > zgj
n
is called the head-count ratio.
4.3 Axioms
Continuity requires that an index function be robust to small misspecification of data.
Continuity. An index function I : [0; y¯]n ! R is continuous.
We through this chapter assume that index functions are continuous.*27 Next,monotonicity
requires that if all individuals’ ages weekly increase and some individuals’ ages strictly
increase, then the index strictly increase.
*27In our analysis, an age is a real number in [0; y¯] because we actually consider the normalized age yi=y¯ 2 [0; 1]
in characterization results.
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Monotonicity. For each y; y0 2 [0; y¯]n, if yi  y0i for all i 2 N and y j > y0j for some j 2 N ,
then I (y) > I (y0).
Consider two arbitrary age profiles with a common age for some individual. Separability
requires that if this common age is replaced with another one, then an index function preserves
the order between the two age profiles.
Separability. For each y; y0 2 [0; y¯]n, and each j 2 N ,
I (y j; y  j )  I (y j; y0  j ) =) I (y0j; y  j )  I (y0j; y0  j ):
The next axiom is proposed in this ，, which requires sensitivity to thickness of the
working age population. The working age principle requires that for any age profile, if any
two individuals’ ages are replaced by others while preserving its sum, then an index function
weakly decreases whenever the sum of residual terms for working among these two individuals
weakly increases.
TheWorking Age Principle. For each y 2 [0; y¯]n, each i; j 2 N , and each y0i; y0j 2 [0; y¯]with
y0i + y
0
j = yi + y j ,
a(yi) + a(y j )  a(y0i ) + a(y0j ) =) I
 
y
  I  y0i; y0j; y fi; jg :
This axiom is inspired by the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Dalton 1920). Theworking
age principle can be interpreted as follows: A virtual transfer of age from an individual to
another individual weakly reduces the value of the index if the sum of their residual terms for
working weakly increases. For example, consider the following three age profiles in which
n = 3,
y = (25; 45; 75);
y0 = (25; 50; 70);
y00 = (25; 40; 80):
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Suppose that x = 20 and z = 65 in this society. Since
a(y2) + a(y3) = (65   45) + 0 = 20 > 15 = (65   50) + 0 = a(y02) + a(y03);
that is, a transfer of 5 age from individual 3 to individual 2 causes a decrease in the sum
of their residual terms for working, it follows that I (y)  I (y0). On the other hand, since
a(y2) + a(y3) < a(y002 ) + a(y
00
3 ), that is, a transfer of 5 age from individual 2 to 3 causes an
increase in the sum of their residual terms for working, it follows that I (y)  I (y00).
Finally, normalization requires that for any age profile, if all individuals are the same age,
then its index takes a value of the age over the maximal age y¯.
Normalization. For each y 2 [0; y¯],
I (y; : : : ; y) =
y
y¯
2 [0; 1]:
4.4 A New Measure of Population Ageing
Our purpose is to search for measures of population ageing that satisfy elementary properties
stated in the previous section. First, we introduce an index function that represents an ordering
on age profiles. For each   0, let I : [0; y¯]n ! R be such that
I (y) =
nX
j=1
y j + 
nX
j=1
 
z   x   a(y j ) :
We show that a continuous index function I satisfies monotonicity, separability, and the
working age principle if and only if the ordering represented by I is the same ordering
represented by I for some   0.
Theorem 1. For each continuous index function I : [0; y¯]n ! R, the following statements (i)
and (ii) are equivalent:
(i) I : [0; y¯]n ! R satisfies monotonicity, separability, and the working age principle;
(ii) there exists   0 such that for each y; y0 2 [0; y¯]n,
I (y0)  I (y) () I (y0)  I (y):
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Since I is a representation function of an ordering, the represented ordering remains
unchanged if I is monotonically transformed. For example, let
I0 (y) =
1
1 + 
*.,
1
n
nX
j=1
y j + 
1
n
nX
j=1

z   x   a(y j )
+/- :
Then I0 represents the same ordering. The first term in the biggest bracket in I0 is the mean
age, the second one is the mean term that individuals have worked for, and I0 is a convex
combination of them. A parameter  is the degree of sensitivity to the thickness of working
age population. It could coincide with the mean age when  = 0. This is caused by the
weakness of the working age principle. Indeed, it permits that whenever y0i + y
0
j = yi + y j
holds,
I
 
y

= I
 
y0i; y
0
j; y fi; jg

:
We introduce the strict working age principle to exclude the mean age, which fails to respect
the thickness of working age population.
TheStrictWorkingAgePrinciple. For each y 2 [0; y¯]n, each i; j 2 N , and each y0i; y0j 2 [0; y¯]
with y0i + y
0
j = yi + y j ,
a(yi) + a(y j ) = a(y0i ) + a(y
0
j ) =) I
 
y

= I
 
y0i; y
0
j; y fi; jg

;
a(yi) + a(y j ) < a(y0i ) + a(y
0
j ) =) I
 
y

> I
 
y0i; y
0
j; y fi; jg

:
Replace the working age principle with the strict version, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For each continuous index function I : [0; y¯]n ! R, the following statements (i)
and (ii) are equivalent:
(i) I : [0; y¯]n ! R satisfies monotonicity, separability, and the strict working age principle;
(ii) there exists  > 0 such that for each y; y0 2 [0; y¯]n,
I (y0)  I (y) () I (y0)  I (y):
Examples showing the tightness of the axioms in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are provided
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in the Appendix. Finally, we characterize an index function that satisfies monotonicity,
separability, the strict working age principle, and the normalization.
For each  > 0, let f : [0; y¯] ! R be such that for each yi 2 [0; y¯],
f (yi) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
yi if yi < x;
(1 + )yi   x if x  yi  z;
yi + (z   x) if z < yi :
Note that
I (y) =
nX
j=1
f (y j ):
Corollary 2. For each continuous index function I : [0; y¯]n ! R, the following statements (i)
and (ii) are equivalent:
(i) I : [0; y¯]n ! R satisfies monotonicity, separability, the strict working age principle, and
normalization;
(ii) there exists  > 0 such that
I (y) =
1
y¯
 f  1
 
1
n
I (y)
!
:
We illustrate diﬀerences between the head-count ratio and our newmeasure, using China’s
and Japan’s population data.*28 We focus on China’s 1990–2015 data for three reasons: (i)
China’s population ageing had became serious in this term. Indeed, in 2002, China was
classified as an “ageing society" by the United Nations since its head-count ratio exceeded
7%. (ii) Moreover, the year 1990 is about ten years after the government of China oﬃcially
enacted its unparalleled “one-child policy". (iii) In addition, at almost the same time, market-
oriented economic reforms were made by the government, which induced several decades of
rapid economic growth that would also tend to decrease fertility rates in China (Zhang 2017).
By focusing on this term, we check policy impacts on population ageing in China.
We use Japan’s data as a benchmark since its population ageing is the most serious one.
We focus on Japan’s 1962–1987 data because in this term, also in Japan, its population ageing
*28Population data are sourced from United Nations (2017).
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had became serious and an economic growth called the “Japanese economic miracle" had
occurred. In addition, we focus on these terms since the head-count ratio and our measure
behave very diﬀerently in the following computation.
Figure 6: the head-count ratios and our measures
Figure 6 shows computation results of the head-count ratios and our measures for China’s
1990–2015 and Japan’s 1962–1987 data. In the left plot, we can see that the head-count ratio
of China increases in a similar way as Japan in these terms, but it is always smaller than that
of Japan. So, we use the head-count ratio as a measure of population ageing, we perceive that
China’s population ageing is similar to Japan in these terms. However, it may be misleading.
In the right plot, we can see that our measure for China, rapidly increases and exceeds that for
Japan in the same terms.*29
This empirical example tells us the following things. If we use the head-count ratio, we
might underestimate the population ageing in China. On the other hand, our measure can
*29In this computation, we fix x = 20, z = 65, y¯ = 100, and  = 1 for simplicity. However, we can get similar
results if we change these exogenous variables to some extent. For example, when we change xChina = 15
while xJapan remains the same by considering conventions for starting age for working in China, our measure
for China will decrease because the amount of labor force will increase, but we can get a similar result in which
our measure for China exceeds that for Japan.
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vividly capture China’s rapid population ageing. This is because our measure is sensitive
to the thickness of potential working age population more than the head-count ratio. Our
measure for China sharply increases probably because of a decrease in fertility rate aﬀected
by governmental policies of China.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
As far as the authors know, this study is the first one that axiomatically analyzes the measure-
ment of population ageing. Our study is inspired by Sen (1976)’s criticism of the head-count
ratio inmeasurement of poverty. A distinct point from the literature ofmeasurement of poverty
is that they focus on left-tail of income distributions (low incomes) and require monotonicity
and sensitivity to inequality within left-tail distributions (e.g., Sen 1976; Foster and Shorrocks
1991). Diﬀering from poverty, population ageing is a trend on the entire distribution, so using
only information of right-tail distributions and discarding residual information is inadequate
to measure the level of population ageing. Therefore, we do not focus on right-tail of age
distributions (older populations). That point mainly diﬀers from Chu (1997), which is in-
spired by the literature of measurement of poverty and proposes a new measure of population
ageing, too. Indeed, his measure focuses on the right-tail of age distributions. In addition, he
does not provide an axiomatization of his measure.
In our analysis, we treat the size of population as fixed. This assumption is imposed
only for simplifying notation and statements of the axioms. Indeed, we can straightforwardly
extend all of our results by invoking results by Foster and Shorrocks (1991). Foster and
Shorrocks (1991) consider income distributions with variable population sizes to characterize
subgroup consistent poverty indices. Subgroup consistency can be interpreted as a generalized
version of our separability, and they characterize the orderings of canonical indices by using
it. Therefore, we can apply their results to characterize a modified version of our index
functions I. In the characterization, the modified index function would be characterized by
a modified version of the working age principle and their set of axioms.
Our proposed measure is the unique measure that satisfies monotonicity, separability, the
strict working age principle, and normalization. Our measure improves all existing measures
in this sense. However, we do not claim that our measure supersedes all of them. Population
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ageing is a complex phenomenon with various facets, so we need to use various measures to
capture it. Our contribution is to add a new tool to a set of measures for population ageing.
Appendix 4
In our proof of Theorem 1, we apply Debreu’s (1959) representation theorem of a preference
on a separable set of variables. We introduce some definitions to apply Debreu’s theorem.
Debreu considers a continuous and complete preordering % on a commodity-bundle space
S  R`. Suppose that this space can be decomposed into n subspaces S1; : : : ; Sn (n  `), that
is,
S = ni=1Si :
The factors 1; : : : ; n are independent if for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, all yi; y0i 2 Si, and all y i; y0 i 2
 j,iSj ,
(yi; y i) % (y0i; y i) () (yi; y0 i) % (y0i; y0 i):
A factor i 2 f1; : : : ; ng is essential if there exist y i 2  j,iSj and yi; y0i 2 Si such that
(yi; y i)  (y0i; y i):
Debreu’s Representation Theorem (Debreu 1959, Theorem 3). Suppose that the factors
1; : : : ; n are independent and that at least three of them are essential. If Si is connected for
each i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, then a continuous and complete preordering % on S = ni=1Si can be
represented by an additively separable utility function: that is, for each i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, there
exists a continuous functionUi : Si ! R, and for each y; y0 2 S,
y % y0 ()
nX
i=1
Ui (yi) 
nX
i=1
Ui (y0i):
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. One can easily check that (ii) implies (i). Let us show that (i) implies (ii). Consider
a continuous index function I : [0; y¯]n ! R that satisfies monotonicity, separability, and the
working age principle.
58
Step 1: find a function that is ordinally equivalent to I . To apply Debreu’s Representa-
tion Theorem, generate a continuous and complete preordering % on [0; y¯]n from I according
to Euclidean distance  on R: for each y; y0 2 [0; y¯]n,
y % y0 () I (y)  I (y0): (4.17)
Note that the space [0; y¯] is connected.
First, we claim that the factors 1; : : : ; n are independent. For each i 2 N , each yi; y0i 2 [0; y¯],
and each y i; y0 i 2 [0; 1]n 1, by (4.17) and separability of I,
(yi; y i) % (y0i; y i) () I (yi; y i)  I (y0i; y i)
() I (yi; y0 i)  I (y0i; y0 i)
() (yi; y0 i) % (y0i; y0 i):
Second, we claim that all factors i 2 f1; : : : ; ng are essential. Take any i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Let
yi; y
0
i 2 [0; y¯] be such that yi > y0i . Then by monotonicity of I, for each y i 2 [0; y¯]n,
I (yi; y i) > I (y0i; y i):
Hence
(yi; y i) % (y0i; y i):
Therefore, Debreu’s Representation Theorem can be applied to % on [0; y¯]n. That is, for
each j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, there exists a continuous function f j : [0; y¯] ! R such that for each
y; y0 2 [0; y¯]n,
y % y0 ()
nX
j=1
f j (y j ) 
nX
j=1
f j (y0j ): (4.18)
Therefore,
I (y)  I (y0) ()
nX
j=1
f j (y j ) 
nX
j=1
f j (y0j ): (4.19)
Step 2: 9 f : [0; y¯] ! R; I (y)  I (y0) () Pn
j=1 f (y j ) 
Pn
j=1 f (y
0
j
). Let us show
that for each j 2 N , f1 = f j + f1(0)   f j (0). Take any j 2 N . Suppose, by contradiction,
59
that f1 , f j + f1(0)   f j (0). Without loss of generality, consider the case with f1 >
f j + f1(0)   f j (0). Then, there exists b 2 [0; y¯] such that f1(b) > f j (b) + f1(0)   f j (0).
Thus,
f1(b) + f j (0) > f1(0) + f j (b): (4.20)
On the other hand, since
b + 0 = 0 + b and a(b) + a(0)  a(0) + a(b);
by the working age principle
I (b; y2; : : : ; 0|{z}
j th
; : : : ; yn)  I (0; y2 : : : ; b|{z}
j th
; : : : ; yn) for all y 1; j 2 [0; y¯]n 2:
Therefore,
f1(b) + f j (0)  f1(0) + f j (b);
a contradiction to equation (4.20). Therefore, f1 = f j + f1(0)   f j (0). Then, by equation
(4.19) of Step 1,
I (y)  I (y0) ()
nX
j=1
f1(y j ) 
nX
j=1
f1(y0j ):
For each   0, let f : [0; y¯] ! R be such that for each yi 2 [0; y¯],
f (yi) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
yi if yi < x;
(1 + )yi   x if x  yi  z;
yi + (z   x) if z < yi :
Note that
I (y) =
nX
j=1
f (y j ):
Therefore, it suﬃces to show that there exists   0 such that
nX
j=1
f (y j ) 
nX
j=1
f (y j ) ()
nX
j=1
f (y j ) 
nX
j=1
f (y j ):
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Step 3: 9b1; c1 2 R; 8yi 2 [0; x); f (yi) = b1yi + c1. Note that for each yi; y j 2 [0; x),
a(yi) + a(y j ) = 2(z   x) = a
 yi + y j
2

+ a
 yi + y j
2

:
Then, since I : [0; y¯]n ! R satisfies the working age principle, for each yi; y j 2 [0; x),
f (yi) + f (y j ) = 2 f
 yi + y j
2
; z

:
It in turn implies that for each yi; y j 2 [0; x),
1
2
f (yi) +
1
2
f (y j ) = f
 yi + y j
2

:
Then, by continuity of f () and Sierpinski Theorem, f () is convex and concave on [0; x],
that is, for each yi; y j 2 [0; x] and  2 [0; 1],
 f (yi) + (1   ) f (y j ) = f  yi + (1   )y j  : (4.21)
Let
b1 =
1
x
 
f (x)   f (0);
c1 = f (0):
We shall show that for each yi 2 [0; x),
f (yi) = b1yi + c1: (4.22)
Take any yi 2 [0; x). Then, since yi = yix  x + (1   yix )  0, by (4.21),
f (yi) =
yi
x
f (x) + (1   yi
x
) f (0)
= b1yi + c1:
Therefore, (4.22) holds.
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Step 4: 9b2; c2 2 R; 8yi 2 [x; z]; f (yi) = b2yi + c2. Note that for each yi; y j 2 [x; z],
a(yi) + a(y j ) = yi + y j   2x = a
 yi + y j
2

+ a
 yi + y j
2

:
Since I : [0; y¯]n ! R satisfies the working age principle, for each yi; y j 2 [x; z],
f (yi) + f (y j ) = 2 f
 yi + y j
2
; z

;
that is,
1
2
f (yi) +
1
2
f (y j ) = f
 yi + y j
2

:
Then, by a similar argument to Step 1, there exists b2; c2 2 R such that for each yi 2 [x; z],
f (yi) = b2yi + c2.
Step 5: 9b3; c3 2 R; 8yi 2 (z; y¯); f (yi) = b3yi + c3. Note that for each yi; y j 2 (z; y¯],
a(yi) + a(y j ) = 0 = a
 yi + y j
2

+ a
 yi + y j
2

:
Since I : [0; y¯]n ! R satisfies the working age principle, for each yi; y j 2 (z; y¯],
f (yi) + f (y j ) = 2 f
 yi + y j
2
; z

;
that is,
1
2
f (yi) +
1
2
f (y j ) = f
 yi + y j
2

:
Then, by a similar argument to Step 1, there exists b3; c3 2 R such that for each yi 2 (z; y¯],
f (yi) = b3yi + c3.
Step 6: 0 < b1 = b3  b2. By monotonicity, clearly b1; b2; b3 > 0: Let us show that
b1 = b3. Take any yi 2 [0; x) and any y j 2 (z; y¯]. Let  > 0 be such that  < minfx yi; y j zg.
Then, yi +  2 [0; x) and y j    2 (z; y¯]. Moreover,
a(yi) + a(y j ) = z   x = a(yi +  ) + a(y j    ):
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Therefore, by the working age principle,
f (yi) + f (y j ) = f (yi +  ) + f (y j    );
that is,
b1yi + c1 + b3y j + c3 = b1(yi +  ) + c1 + b3(y j    ) + c3:
It in turn implies that b1 = b3.
We next show that b3  b2. Take any yi 2 [x; z) and any y j 2 (z; y¯]. Let  > 0 be such
that  < minfz   yi; y j   zg. Then, yi +  2 [x; z] and y j    2 (z; y¯]. Moreover,
a(yi) + a(y j ) = z   yi > z   (yi +  ) = a(yi +  ) + a(y j    ):
Therefore, by the working age principle,
f (yi) + f (y j )  f (yi +  ) + f (y j    );
that is,
b2yi + c2 + b3y j + c3  b2(yi +  ) + c2 + b3(y j    ) + c3:
It in turn implies that b3  b2.
Step 7: c2 =   b2   b1x + c1, and c3 =  b2   b1 (z   x) + c1. By continuity of f
at x, it follows that
b1x + c1 = b2x + c2:
Therefore,
c2 =   b2   b1 x + c1:
Similarly, by continuity of f at z, it follows that
b2z + c2 = b3z + c3:
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Therefore, by b1 = b3,
c3 =
 
b2   b3 z + c2 =  b2   b1 z    b2   b1 x + c1 =  b2   b1 (z   x) + c1:
Step 8: 9  0; Pn
j=1 f (y j ) 
Pn
j=1 f (x j ) ()
Pn
j=1 f (y j ) 
Pn
j=1 f (x j ).
By Steps 1-5, for each yi 2 [0; y¯],
f (yi) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
b1yi + c1 if yi < x;
b2yi    b2   b1 x + c1 if x  yi  z;
b1yi +
 
b2   b1 (z   x) + c1 if z < yi :
Let
 =
b2
b1
  1:
Since b2  b1, we have   0. Then, for each yi 2 [0; y¯],
f (yi) = b1 f (yi) + c1: (4.23)
Therefore,
nX
j=1
f (y j ) 
nX
j=1
f (x j ) ()
nX
j=1
f (y j ) 
nX
j=1
f (x j ):

Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. One can easily check that (ii) implies (i). Note that if an index function I induces the
same ordering as I0, then I violates the strict working age principle. Therefore, by Theorem
1, (i) implies (ii). 
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. One can easily check that (ii) implies (i). We show that (i) implies (ii). Since
I : [0; y¯]n ! R satisfies continuity, monotonicity, separability, and normalization, there exists
64
a continuous and strictly increasing function f : [0; y¯] ! R such that
I (y) =
1
y¯
 f  1
1
n
nX
j=1
f (y j )

:
Moreover, by the same argument as Proof of Theorem 1 (equation 4.23), there exist ; b > 0
and c 2 R such that
f (yi) = b f (yi) + c:
Then, for each s 2 R,
f  1(s) = f  1
  s   c
b

:
Therefore,
I (y) =
1
y¯
 f  1
1
n
nX
j=1
f (y j )

=
1
y¯
 f  1
1
n
nX
j=1
 
b f (yi) + c

=
1
y¯
 f  1
 1n Pnj=1  b f (yi) + c   c
b

=
1
y¯
 f  1

I (y)

:

Tightness of the axioms
• Let I1 : [0; y¯]n ! R be an index function such that
I1(y) =
nX
j=1
 
z   x   a(y j ) for all y 2 [0; y¯]n:
Monotonicity: Let y = (0; 0; : : : ; 0) and y0 = (x; x; : : : ; x). Then y0 > y. By the
definition of a(), for each j 2 N , a(y j ) = a(y0j ). Therefore, I1(y) = I1(y0). Thus, I1 violates
monotonicity.
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Separability: Consider any y; y0 2 Rn+. Then, for each i 2 N ,X
j,i
 
z   x   a(y j ) + z   x   a(yi)  X
j,i
 
z   x   a(y0j )

+ z   x   a(yi)
()
X
j,i
 
z   x   a(y j ) + z   x   a(y0i )  X
j,i
 
z   x   a(y0j )

+ z   x   a(y0i )
Therefore,
I1(y j; y  j )  I1(y j; y0  j ) () I1(y0j; y  j )  I1(y0j; y0  j ):
Thus, I1 satisfies separability.
Working age principle: Consider any y 2 Rn+ and y0i; y0j 2 R+. If a(yi) + a(y j ) =
a(y0i ) + a(y
0
j ), then
nX
k=1
 
z   x   a(yk ) = X
k,i; j
 
z   x   a(y0j )

+ z   x   a(y0i ) + z   x   a(y0j ):
If a(yi) + a(y j ) < a(y0i ) + a(y
0
j ), then
nX
k=1
 
z   x   a(yk ) > X
k,i; j
 
z   x   a(y0j )

+ z   x   a(y0i ) + z   x   a(y0j ):
Thus, I2 satisfies the strict working age principle.
• Let I2 : [0; y¯]n ! R be an index function such that
I2(y) =
nX
j=1
y j +
 nX
j=1
 
z   x   a(y j )2 for all y 2 [0; y¯]n:
Monotonicity and the working age principle: Obviously, I2 satisfies monotonicity and the
working age principle.
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Separability: Let g2 : [0; y¯] ! R be such that for each y j 2 [0; y¯],
g2(y j ) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if yi < x;
yi   x if x  yi  z;
z   x if z < yi :
Then, g2(y j ) = z   x   a(y j ). Therefore, for each y; y0 2 [0; y¯]n, we can compute that
I2(yi; y i)   I2(yi; y0 i)
=
X
j,i
y j  
X
j,i
y0j +

2g2(yi) +
X
j,i
g2(y j ) +
X
j,i
g2(y0j )
 X
j,i
g2(y j )
  X
j,i
g2(y0j )

: (4.24)
Let " > 0 be such that
1
2
 
x + 2"2 + "

< x and x + "  z:
Fix some i 2 N , and let
y i =
1
2
 
x + 2"2 + "

;
1
2
 
x + 2"2 + "

; 0; : : : ; 0

2 [0; y¯]n 1;
y0 i =
 
x + "; 0; : : : ; 0
 2 [0; y¯]n 1:
Then, by equation (4.24), we have
I2(0; y i)   I2(0; y0 i) = (x + 2"2 + ")   (x + ") +

"  ( ")

= "2 > 0:
On the other hand, by equation (4.24), we have
I2(x + "; y i)   I2(x + "; y0 i) = (x + 2"2 + ")   (x + ") +

(2" + ")  ( ")

=  "2 < 0:
Thus, I2 violates separability.
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• Let I3 : [0; 1]n ! R be the index function such that
I3(y) =
nX
j=1
y2j for all y 2 [0; y¯]n:
Obviously I3 satisfies monotonicity and separability.
Working age principle: Consider any y i; j . Let yi = x, y j = z and y0i = y j =
x+z
2 . Then,
yi + y j = y
0
i + y
0
j and a(yi) + a(y j ) = a(y
0
i ) + a(y
0
j ). But
I3(y)   I3(y0i; y0j; y i; j ) = x2 + z2  
 x + z
2
2
=
1
2
(z   x)2 > 0:
Therefore, I3 violate the working age principle.
These functions induce diﬀerent orderings from I. The satisfaction and the violation
of axioms by these functions are summarized by Table 7. It shows the independence of the
axioms in our Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
MON SEP WAP SWAP
I1   + + +
I2 +   + +
I3 + +    
Table 7: Tightness of axioms
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